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ABSTRACT 
Breaches of security, a.k.a. security and data breaches, are on the rise, one of the reasons being 
the well-known lack of incentives to secure services and their underlying technologies, such as 
cloud computing. In this article, I question whether the patchwork of six EU instruments 
addressing breaches (Framework Directive, e-Privacy Directive, eIDAS Regulation, PSD2, 
GDPR, NIS Directive) is helping to prevent or mitigate breaches as intended. At a lower level 
of abstraction, the question concerns appraising the success of each instrument separately. At a 
higher level of abstraction, since all laws converge on the objective of network and information 
security ± one of the three pillars of the EU cyber security policy ± the question is whether the 
OHJDO µSDWFKZRUN¶ LV KHOSLQJ WR µSDWFK¶ WKH XQGHUO\LQJ LQVHFXULW\ RI QHWZRUN DQG LQIRUPDWLRQ
systems thus contributing to cyber security. To answer the research question, I look at the 
regulatory framework as a whole, from the perspective of network and information security and 
consequently I use the expression cyber security breaches. I appraise the regulatory patchwork 
by using the three goals of notification identified by the European Commission as a benchmark, 
enriched by policy documents, legal analysis, and academic literature on breaches legislation, 
and I elaborate my analysis by reasoning on the case of cloud computing. The analysis, which 
is frustrated by the lack of adequate data, shows that the regulatory framework on cyber 
security breaches may be failing to provide the necessary level of mutual learning on the 
functioning of security measures, awareness of both regulatory authorities and the public on 
how entities fare in protecting data (and the related network and information systems), and 
enforcing self-improvement of entities dealing with information and services. I conclude with 
some recommendations addressing the causes, rather than the symptoms, of network and 
information systems insecurity. 
Keywords: Data breaches, security breaches, cyber security, data protection, network and 
information security, cloud computing, data security breaches, GDPR, NIS Directive, Telecom 
Framework, eIDAS, PSD 2 
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1. Introduction 
News of public and private organizations being breached proliferate. While not all breaches 
of security are caused by cybercrime,1 the term generally refers to the unauthorized access to network 
and information systems, which can lead to further cybercrimes, such as WKHµH[ILOWUDWLRQ¶RIGDWDLH
the creation of unauthorized copies for dissemination, sale, or for blackmailing through the 
information contained in such data. Breaches of security affecting personal data, usually referred to as 
µGDWD EUHDFKHV¶ KDYH RQ average increased in size in 2017,2 and are almost a daily occurrence, so 
much so that it has become difficult to keep track of them. The security firm Gemalto3 boldly suggests 
WKDW WKHTXHVWLRQLVQRWZKHWKHURQH¶VQHWZRUNDQG LQIRUPDWLRQV\VWHPZLOOEHEreached or not, but 
rather when the breach will take place. 
Such a bleak scenario may not fully reflect reality yet, but could provide an accurate 
description of the (near) future, if the root causes of security breaches remain unaddressed. A well-
known root cause of breaches is the underinvestment in network and information security, which is 
often seen as a burden, rather than an asset.4 Hence, in addition to attaching criminal liability to 
perpetrating, or aiding and abetting, data and security breaches, several jurisdictions,5 including the 
(8KDYHRSWHGIRUWKHLPSRVLWLRQRIOHJDOREOLJDWLRQVWRSURWHFWRQH¶VV\VWHPVDQGGDWD7KHVHKDYH
been coupled with the adoption of legal devices such as the notification of breaches to a supervisory 
authority and, possibly, to the (affected) public.   
In its Impact Assessment accompanying the proposed General Data Protection Regulation 
(hereafter GDPR), the European Commission identified three advantages of notification. In detail, 
³Ereach notifications provide a systematic feedback about the actual risk and the actual weaknesses of 
existing security measures; they enable authorities and consumers to assess the relative capabilities of 
data controllers with respect to data security; they force data controllers to assess and understand their 
own situation regarding security PHDVXUHV´6 , GXE WKH WKUHH DGYDQWDJHV RI QRWLILFDWLRQ DV µPXWXDO
OHDUQLQJ¶ µSXEOLF DZDUHQHVV¶ DQG µVHOI-LPSURYHPHQW¶ UHVSHFWLYHO\ +RZHYHU, notification is not 
without faults: Burdon and others submit that it is conceptually incoherent, because it tries to balance 
FRQIOLFWLQJFRQFHSWV³QDPHO\WKHSURYLVLRQRIHIIHFWLYHFRQVXPHUSURWHFWLRQDQGWKHSULRULWLVDWLRQRI
FRUSRUDWH FRPSOLDQFH FRVW PLWLJDWLRQ´7 Instead of being included in one overarching instrument, 
provisions on the notification and mitigation of data and security breaches have been inserted in 
separate instruments. Hence, I refer to the ensemble of EU laws on security breaches, including data 
breaches, DVDUHJXODWRU\µSDWFKZRUN¶ 
 
In this article, I question whether the EU regulatory framework is helping to prevent or 
mitigate breaches of security as intended. At a lower level of abstraction, the question concerns 
                                                 
1
 Other causes include human error, system glitch and natural disasters: 'DYLG:DOO µ(QHPLHVZLWKLQ
5HGHILQLQJ WKH LQVLGHU WKUHDW LQRUJDQL]DWLRQDO VHFXULW\SROLF\¶6HFXULW\ -RXUQDO -124; Larry Ponemon, 
2017 Cost of Data Breach Study. Global Overview (2017).  
2
 Ponemon (2017), 2017 Cost of Data Breach Study. Global Overview. 
3
 See at: http://breachlevelindex.com/data-breach-risk-assessment-calculator (last accessed on 19th 
December 2017). Some commentators go in the same direction, suggesting that the focus should be on harm 
reduction rather than prevention. Ioannis Agrafiotis and others, Cyber Harm: Concepts, Taxonomy and 
Measurement (Saïd Business School WP 2016-23, 2016). 
4
 5RVV$QGHUVRQDQG7\OHU0RRUH µ7KH(FRQRPLFVRI ,QIRUPDWLRQ6HFXULW\¶ 6FLHQFH-
 0DUN %XUGRQ%LOO /DQH DQG 3DXO YRQ 1HVVHQ µ'DWD EUHDFK QRWLILFDWLRQ ODZ LQ WKH (8 DQG $XVWUDOLD - 
:KHUHWRQRZ"¶&RPSXWHU/DZ	6HFXULW\5HYLHZ-307. 
5
 The first law was passed by the State of California. Burdon, /DQHDQGYRQ1HVVHQµ'DWDEUHDFK
QRWLILFDWLRQODZLQWKH(8DQG$XVWUDOLDH:KHUHWRQRZ"¶ See also at: https://iapp.org/news/a/eu-data-breach-
notification-rule-the-key-elements/. 
6
 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2012) 72 final. Impact Assessment 
Accompanying the General Data Protection Regulation (2012), p. 100. 
7
 %XUGRQ/DQHDQGYRQ1HVVHQµ'DWDEUHDFKQRWLILFDWLRQODZLQthe EU and Australia - Where to 
QRZ"¶S 
© 2018 Maria Grazia Porcedda, Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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appraising the success of each instrument separately ± to the extent feasible with respect to the 
availability of data and state of implementation of the rules. At a higher level of abstraction, since, as I 
will demonstrate, all laws converge on the objective of network and information security (one of the 
three pillars of the EU cybersecurity policy8WKHTXHVWLRQLVZKHWKHUWKHOHJDOµSDWFKZRUN¶LVKHOSLQJ
WR µSDWFK¶ WKH XQGHUO\LQJ LQVHFXULW\ RI QHWZRUN DQG LQIRUPDWLRQ V\VWHPV ± thus contributing to 
cybersecurity. To answer the research question, I will look at the regulatory framework as a whole, 
from the perspective of network and information security, rather than focussing on the distinction 
between personal/non-personal data. 7R UHIHU WR DOO EUHDFKHV , XVH WKH H[SUHVVLRQ µF\EHU VHFXULW\
EUHDFKHV¶9This is in agreement with the suggestion advanced by Burdon et al.10  I appraise the 
regulatory patchwork by using the three goals of notification identified by the European Commission 
as a benchmark; I further enhanced them with policy documents, legal analysis, and academic 
literature on data and security breaches legislation,11 to which I endeavour to contribute. 
I begin by illustrating the EU regulatory patchwork on breaches of security, which is 
composed of six instruments emerged through three regulatory waves. I subsequently illustrate the 
µVWDWH RI WKH IUDPHZRUN¶ E\ IRFXVVLQJ LQ SDUWLFXODU RQ WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI EUHDFKHV WKH UXOHV RQ WKH
notification and mitigation of breaches, and provisions on inventories, sanctions and liabilities. In the 
next section, I appraise the regulatory framework. The only instruments that can be appraised 
individually and hence lead to answering the research question at a lower level of abstraction, are 
those relating to the first regulatory wave. Based on the (unsatisfactory) evidence gathered, I propose 
a method to evaluate the regulatory framework as a whole at the higher level of abstraction. I then 
reason on the implications of my findings with reference to the case of cloud computing, which is 
addressed in both the second and third regulatory wave. There, I propose to reflect on the possible 
consequences of the state of the art with reference to the scenario of universities with teaching 
hospitals. I must warn the reader that the analysis is speculative due to the evolving legal landscape. 
In the conclusion, I address the pun in the title, i.e. whether the legal paWFKZRUN µSDWFKHV¶ WKH
insecurity of network and information systems causing breaches, and further fuelled by breaches, and 
whether it needs patching to do so. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU ((Joint 
Communication )JOIN(2017) 450 final, 2017); European Commission and High Representative of the European 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Cyber Security Strategy: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace 
((Joint Communication) JOIN (2013) 01 final, 2013). 
9
 The term cyber security breaches does not have legal significance, but, as I hope to illustrate in section 
3, nicely captures the gist of the problem. It is currently used in the UK yearly official statistics on breaches (see 
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/cyber- security- breaches- survey). 
10
 %XUGRQ/DQHDQGYRQ1HVVHQµ'DWDEUHDFKQRWLILFDWLRQODZLQWKH(8DQG$XVWUDOLD - Where 
WRQRZ"¶ 
11
 %XUGRQ/DQHDQGYRQ1HVVHQµ'DWDEUHDFKQRWLILFDWLRQODZLQWKH(8DQG$XVWUDOLD - Where 
WRQRZ"¶$SRVWRORV0DODWUDVDQGRWKHUVµ3DQ-European personal data breaches: Mapping of current practices 
DQG UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV WR IDFLOLWDWH FRRSHUDWLRQ DPRQJ 'DWD 3URWHFWLRQ $XWKRULWLHV¶  &RPSXWHU /DZ DQG
Security Review 458-5DFKHO03HWHUVµ6RYou've Been Notified, Now What? The Problem with Current 
'DWD%UHDFK1RWLILFDWLRQ/DZV¶ $UL]RQD/DZ5HYLHZ-5RVD%DUFHOR µ(85HYLVLRQRI WKH
H3ULYDF\'LUHFWLYH¶&RPSXWHU/DZ5HYLHZ,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HEHFFD:RQJData Security Breaches 
and Privacy in Europe (Springer 2015). 
© 2018 Maria Grazia Porcedda, Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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2. The EU law on cyber security breaches: 3 regulatory waves, 2 regimes, seven 
addressees  
There are at least eleven instruments of EU law having a bearing on breaches, five in the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)12 and six in the internal market.13 This article concerns 
instruments that mostly find their legal basis in Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU, former Article 95, internal market), which were adopted in three waves, and 
are usually grouped into two different regimes, as I articulate in the following. Rules on breaches of 
security are covered in multiple instruments because the matter is mostly dealt with in a sectorial 
manner. There are at least seven different addressees, which I illustrate in the last section of this part. 
 
2.1. THREE WAVES, TWO SEEMING REGIMES 
Rules concerning breaches of security were introduced in three waves. The first wave 
occurred with the adoption of the so-FDOOHG 7HOHFRP 3DFNDJH FRPSRVHG RI WKH &LWL]HQV¶ 5LJKWV
Directive,14 which amended the e-Privacy Directive, and the Better Regulation Directive15 amending 
the Framework Directive. The former introduced in the e-Privacy Directive16 rules on the prevention 
and mitigation of data breaches. The latter amended the Framework Directive17 by adding rules on 
breaches of security.  
The second regulatory wave includes four instruments, whose rules will enter into force in the 
course of 2018. The first is the Electronic Identification and Assurance Services (hereafter eIDAS) 
Regulation18 (based on art. 294 TFEU), which contains provisions on breaches of security relating to 
                                                 
12
 Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which deals with rapprochement of 
legislation in the area of criminal law, as well as police and judicial cooperation. Consolidated versions of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), OJ C 
83/01 (Lisbon Treaty). Three are generic instruments that may be of use in case of computer crime-related 
investigations: the European Investigation Order Directive; the Proceeds of Crime Directive; and the European 
Arrest Warrant. The fourth AFSJ-related instruments is the Directive on attacks against information systems, 
which lays down substantive provisions on computer-related crimes to which data breaches usually refer. The 
fifth instrument is the Europol Regulation. 
13
 I describe five of these instruments in detail in 0DULD*UD]LD3RUFHGGDµ5HJXODWLRQRI'DWD%UHDFKHV
LQ WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ 3ULYDWH &RPSDQLHV LQ WKH 'ULYHU¶V 6HDW RI &\EHUVHFXULW\"¶ in Carrapico Helena and 
Olrdich Bures (eds), Security Privatization How Non-security-related Private Businesses Shape Security 
Governance (Springer 2018). 
14
 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
Amending DLUHFWLYH(&RQ8QLYHUVDO6HUYLFHDQG8VHUV¶5LJKWVUHODWLQJWR(OHFWURQLF&RPPXQLFDWLRQV
Networks and Services, Directive 2002/58/EC Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of 
Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on Cooperation between 
National Authorities Responsible for the Enforcement of Consumer Protection Laws, OJ L 337 (Citizens' Rights 
Directive). 
15
 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, 
OJ L 337 (Better Regulation Directive). 
16
 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the 
Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, OJ L 201 
(e-Privacy Directive). 
17
 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a Common 
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services (Framework Directive), OJ L 
108. 
18
 Regulation 910/2014/EU of the European Parliament and Council of 23 July 2014 on Electronic 
Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions in the Internal Market and Repealing Directive 
1999/93/EC, OJ L257. 
© 2018 Maria Grazia Porcedda, Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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identity assurance services and trust services. The second is the reviewed Payment Services Directive 
(hereafter PSD2)19 which introduced rules on operational and security incidents affecting in particular 
electronic payments enabled by payment services providers. The third is the Network and Information 
Security (hereafter NIS) Directive,20 laying down rules on security incidents for the operators of 
essential services and digital service providers. The last instrument is the General Data Protection 
Regulation (hereafter GDPR),21 originally based on both Arts. 114 and 16 TFEU, yet the GDPR fulfils 
the Digital Single Market), which includes wide-ranging provisions on data breaches. Art. 114 was 
dropped in the final draft, but the internal market objective is expressed by several Recitals, and the 
GDPR is an integral part of the Digital Single Market. 
The third regulatory wave, which is happening at the time of writing, concerns the overhaul of 
the Telecom Package. The European Electronic Communications Code (hereafter EECC)22 updates 
the Framework Directive and broadens the addressees of such rules. In contrast, the proposed e-
Privacy Regulation23 (to be based, like the GDPR, on both Arts. 114 and 16 TFEU) is stripped off any 
norms on data breaches. This is because the GDPR is supposed to provide comprehensive and 
exhaustive legislation for all data breaches in this area, irrespective of the addressee. 
The six internal market instruments tend to be conceptually grouped into two regimes. The e-
Privacy Directive and WKH*'35FRQFHUQEUHDFKHVDIIHFWLQJSHUVRQDOGDWDµGDWDEUHDFKHV¶IRUVKRUW
Their rationale is to create incentives of a legal and reputational nature that were hitherto missing so 
that entities processing personal data implement both security and privacy measures. The remaining 
four LQVWUXPHQWV FRQFHUQ µLQFLGHQWV¶ RU µEUHDFKHV RI VHFXULW\¶ RU µORVV RI LQWHJULW\¶ RU µVHFXULW\
LQFLGHQWV¶ ZKLFK GR QRW QHFHVVDULO\ DIIHFW SHUVRQDO GDWD DQG ZKLFK DUH QRW DOZD\V GHDOW ZLWK E\
means of creating incentives. However, as I will demonstrate in Section 3, the two regimes converge 
and, for the sake of averting breaches, they should be dealt with together, under the common label of 
µF\EHUVHFXULW\EUHDFKHV¶ 
 
2.2. ADDRESSEES 
Multiple instruments cover rules on breaches because the matter is mostly dealt with in a 
sectorial manner. There are at least seven different addressees, though this does not immediately 
translate into seven clear-cut regimes of security breaches. 
The e-3ULYDF\DQG)UDPHZRUN'LUHFWLYHVFRQFHUQ³HOHFWURQLFFRPPXQLFDWLRQVVHUYLFHV´ZKLFK
are defined in article 2(c) of the Framework Directive. 24  µ&RPPXQLFDWLRQV¶ LV ³DQ\ LQIRUPDWLRQ
                                                 
19
 Directive 2015/2366/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on 
Payment Services in the Internal Market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, OJ L 337. 
20
 Directive 2016/1148/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 Concerning 
Measures for a High Common Level of Security of Network and Information Systems across the Union, OJ L 
194. 
21
 Regulation 2016/679/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
such data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119/1. Note that the 
GDPR i the Digital Single Market.  
22
 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive Establishing the European Electronic 
Communications Code ((Communication) COM(2016) 590 final, 2016/0288 (COD), 2016). 
23
 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and 
repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications) ((Communication) 
COM (2017) 10 final, 2017/0003(COD), 2017). 
24
 ³$ service normally provided for remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of 
signals on electronic communications networks, including telecommunications services and transmission 
services in networks used for broadcasting, but exclude services providing, or exercising editorial control over, 
content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services; it does not include information 
© 2018 Maria Grazia Porcedda, Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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H[FKDQJHGRUFRQYH\HGEHWZHHQDILQLWHQXPEHURISDUWLHV´$UWG%URDGFDVWFRPPXQLFDWLRQV
(e.g. TV or radio) do noW IDOO ZLWKLQ WKLV GHILQLWLRQ XQOHVV ³WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ FDQ EH UHODWHG WR WKH
LGHQWLILDEOHVXEVFULEHURUXVHUUHFHLYLQJWKHLQIRUPDWLRQ´7\SLFDOO\FRPPXQLFDWLRQVE\PHDQVRID
publicly available electronic communication service would take place on a public communications 
network.25 In brief, these rules apply to Telcos over electronic networks that are available to the public 
(i.e. not private), but concern neither content providers, nor Information Society Services, a category 
embracing many web-based businesses, as I will discuss further below. Note that, in the current draft, 
the EECC will also apply to e-mail providers. 
The eIDAS Regulation concerns two categories: e-identification schemes notified by Member 
States, and trust service providers established in the Union, except thoVH ³XVHG H[FOXVLYHO\ ZLWKLQ
FORVHGV\VWHPVUHVXOWLQJIURPQDWLRQDOODZRUIURPDJUHHPHQWVEHWZHHQDGHILQHGVHWRISDUWLFLSDQWV´
(Art. 2). A trust service is an electronic service consisting of the creation, verification, and validation 
of electronic signatures, electronic seals or electronic time stamps, electronic registered delivery 
services and certificates related to those services, and certificates for website authentication, as well as 
the preservation of electronic signatures, seals or certificates concerning those services (Art. 3 (16)). 
These are fundamental for e-government: by mid-2018, it will be mandatory to recognise mutually 
forms of e-identification across the Member States of the EU.26 Trust services can be qualified or 
unqualified, and the latter can include commercial services. 
7KH36'DGGUHVVHVµSD\PHQWVHUYLFHSURYLGHUV¶ZKLFKHQJDJHLQWKHEXVLQHss activities listed 
in Annex I. These include: traditional credit institutions, such as banks and building societies; 
electronic money institutions;27 post office giro institutions; payment institutions, which include credit 
cards, money remittances and forex services;28 and, under certain circumstances, the ECB, national 
central banks, as well as Member States and their regional entities (Art. 1 (a) to (e) and Recital 24). 
The Directive also covers payment institution services (PIS), which are third parties enabling online 
merchants to accept credit transfers, 29  and account information services (AIS), which aggregate 
financial information on the pD\HU¶VEHKDOI30 (Art. 4 (3) and Annex I). 
The NIS Directive also has two addressees, although they are broadly defined. The first are 
RSHUDWRUV RI HVVHQWLDO VHUYLFHV LH SXEOLF RU SULYDWH HQWLWLHV ZKRVH VHUYLFH L LV µHVVHQWLDO IRU WKH
maintenance of criWLFDOVRFLHWDODQGRUHFRQRPLFDFWLYLWLHV¶LLLWVSURYLVLRQµGHSHQGVRQQHWZRUNDQG
LQIRUPDWLRQV\VWHPV¶DQG LLLZRXOGEHKLJKO\GLVUXSWHGE\ µDQ LQFLGHQW¶DVVHHQDERYHDUWV 
and 5 (1)). Annex II of the Directive contains a list of essential services, which are in the sectors of 
energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructures, health, the drinking water supply and 
distribution, as well as digital infrastructure. The latter include Internet exchange points (IXPs), 
domain name system (DNS) service providers and Top Level Domain name registries, which can be 
H[SRVHGWREUHDFKHV7KHVHFRQGDGGUHVVHHVRIWKH1,6'LUHFWLYHDUHWKUHHW\SHVRIµGLJLWDOVHUYLFHV¶
namely three types of (art. 4 (5)) Information Society Services offered in the EU (defined in section 
VHDUFKHQJLQHVRQOLQHPDUNHWSODFHVDQGFORXGFRPSXWLQJµ2QOLQHPDUNHWSODFH¶DUHH-commerce 
                                                                                                                                                        
VRFLHW\ VHUYLFHV « ZKLFK do not consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQVQHWZRUNV´ 
25
 Further discussed in Section 2.1. 
26
 The website of DG Connect has a list of the qualified trust service providers 
(https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/tl-browser/#/) and the free e-signature package 
(https://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/display/CEFDIGITAL/DSS). 
27
 These deal with digital money. Examples of e-money providers can be found at: https://www.e-
ma.org/our-members (last accessed on February 18th 2018). 
28
 For a list of other services, see https://paymentinstitutions.eu/about-epif/the-payment-institutions-
sector/about (last accessed on February 18th 2018). 
29
 David Baker, New Payment Initiation Service Providers & The Card Networks (The London Institute 
of Banking and Finance 2017) <https://www.libf.ac.uk/news-and-insights/news/detail/2017/04/04/new-
payment-initiation-service-providers-the-card-networks>. 
30
 Editor, FCA moves to clarify scope of regulation of account information services under PSD2 
(Outlaw.com 2017). 
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services allowing purchasing of goods or services. Online search engines are the likes of Google, 
6WDUW3DJH RU 'XFN'XFNJR µ&ORXGFRPSXWLQJ VHUYLFHV¶ ZKLFK , ZLOO GLVFXVV LQ Section 5, include 
webmail services, platforms for the development of smartphone apps, and data servers and farms. 
Finally, the GDPR is a horizontal instrument that will apply, broadly speaking, to any entity 
established in the Union that processes whosoever personal data, or to an entity not established in the 
Union that offers goods or services to data subjects in the Union. This includes the addressees of data 
breaches legislation described above,31 such as digital services, as well as other Information Society 
Services, i.e. providers of content online.  
3. Definition, goals, and tools of the EU regulatory framework on cyber security 
breaches 
In this section, I compare and contrast the six instruments addressing cyber security breaches. 
First ,H[SRXQG WKHGLIIHUHQWXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRI µEUHDFK¶FRQWDLQHGLQ WKHOHJLVODWLRQDQGSURSRVHD
common definition. Secondly, I revise the goals that the different instruments purport to pursue; while 
individual laws differ as to the final harm that they try to avert, they all share the overarching goal of 
achieving network and information security (understood as the first pillar of cybersecurity32). Thirdly, 
I illustrate WKHµWRROV¶FRPPRQO\IRXQGLQWKHWKUHHLQVWUXPHQWVWRFXUEthe occurrence of breaches: the 
adoption of technical and organisational measures, rules on notification of breaches and the timing 
thereof, and further instruments such as inventories, insurance, liability, burden of proof and 
sanctions. 
 
3.1.  DEFINITION OF BREACHES 
Article 2 (h) (i) of the e-3ULYDF\ 'LUHFWLYH GHILQHV D SHUVRQDO GDWD EUHDFK DV ³D EUHDFK RI
security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, 
or access to, personal data transmitted, storHG RU RWKHUZLVH SURFHVVHG´33 ³LQ FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK WKH
SURYLVLRQRIDSXEOLFO\DYDLODEOHHOHFWURQLFFRPPXQLFDWLRQVVHUYLFHLQWKH&RPPXQLW\´:KLOHWKLV
definition may not have been translated equally in the 28 national laws of the Member States (plus 
EFTA countries) transposing the Directive, nevertheless, as of 2018, it will apply uniformly 
throughout the EU thanks to the fact that the definition has been copied into the GDPR (Art. 4(12)). 
&RQYHUVHO\ WKH )UDPHZRUN 'LUHFWLYH GRHV QRW GHILQH µEUHDFK¶ 7KH QRWLRQ LV UHIHUUHG WR LQ
$UWLFOH D ZKHUHE\ ³XQGHUWDNLQJV « QRWLI\ WKH FRPSHWHQW QDWLRQDO UHJXODWRU\ DXWKRULW\ RI D
EUHDFK RI VHFXULW\ RU ORVV RI LQWHJULW\´ DIIHFWLQJ WKH RSHUDWLRQ RI Qetworks or service. Moreover, 
$UWLFOHDFRQFHUQV³VHFXULW\LQFLGHQWV´ZKLFKLVDOVRQRWGHILQHG 
6LPLODUO\WKHH,'$65HJXODWLRQUHIHUVWR³DEUHDFKRIVHFXULW\RUORVVRILQWHJULW\´5HFLWDO
and AUWLPSDFWLQJ³RQWKHWUXVWVHUYLFHSURYLGHGRURQWKHSHUVRQDOGDWDPDLQWDLQHGWKHUHLQ´
(Article 19 (2)), but does not define it. Also similarly to the Framework Directive, paragraph 1 of Art. 
UHIHUVWRµVHFXULW\LQFLGHQWV¶VHHDOVR5HF7KHVDPHFDQEHVDLGIRUEUHDFKHV³WKDWDIIHFW«WKe 
cross-ERUGHUDXWKHQWLFDWLRQRI WKDWVFKHPH´$UWZKRVHPHDQLQJPXVWEHGHULYHGIURPWKH
provision on notification in which they are mentioned. However, integrity is referred to in Article 3(5) 
RIWKH5HJXODWLRQDVDGHILQLQJHOHPHQWRIµDXWKHQWLFDWLRQ¶LH³DQHOHFWURQLFSURFHVVWKDWHQDEOHVWKH
                                                 
31
 It should be noted that the only exception is represented by personal data processed by Telecoms, to 
whom the rules of the e-Privacy Directive apply for as long as the Directive will be in force. 
32
 European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (2013), Cyber Security Strategy, JOIN (2013) 01 final. 
33
 For a discussion of the scope of the article, see %XUGRQ/DQHDQGYRQ1HVVHQ  µ'DWDEUHDFK
notification law in the EU and Australia - :KHUHWRQRZ"¶:RQJData Security Breaches and Privacy 
in Europe. 
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electronic identification of a natural or legal person, or the origin and integrity of data in electronic 
IRUPWREHFRQILUPHG´ 
7KH36'UHIHUVWRµEUHDFK¶RQO\RQFHZLWKUHIHUHQFHWRVWURQJFXVWRPer authentication (Art. 4 
(30)); Art. 96 (1) on breaches refers to operational and security incidents. The NIS Directive features 
WKHH[SUHVVLRQµEUHDFK¶WKUHHWLPHVWZLFH in relation to personal data (Recital 63 and Art. 15 (4)), and 
once, in relation tRVHFXULW\7KHUHVWRIWKH WH[W UHIHUVWRµLQFLGHQW¶DV³DQ\HYHQWKDYLQJDQDFWXDO
DGYHUVHHIIHFWRQWKHVHFXULW\RIQHWZRUNDQGLQIRUPDWLRQV\VWHPV´$UW 
7KUHHQRWLRQVFDQEHVLQJOHGRXWIURPWKLVEULHIVXUYH\RIGHILQLWLRQVµEUHDFKRIVHFXULW\¶µORVV
RILQWHJULW\¶DQGµVHFXULW\LQFLGHQW¶,DUJXHWKDWWKHVHQRWLRQVFRQYHUJHZLWKWKHSDUWLDOH[FHSWLRQ
RI µORVV RI LQWHJULW\¶ 7R SURYH P\ SRLQW LW LV QHFHVVDU\ WR PDNH D GLJUHVVLRQ RQ QHWZRUN DQG
information systems, and the equivalence between information and data. Let us start with the term 
VHFXULW\LQFLGHQWV$VVHHQWKH1,6'LUHFWLYHGHILQHVµLQFLGHQW¶DVDQHYHQWQHJDWLYHO\DIIHFWLQJWKH
VHFXULW\ RI QHWZRUN DQG LQIRUPDWLRQ V\VWHPV 1HWZRUN DQG LQIRUPDWLRQ VHFXULW\ LV GHILQHG DV ³WKH 
ability of network and information systems to resist, at a given level of confidence, any action that 
compromises the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored or transmitted or 
processed data or the related services offered by, or accessible via, those network and information 
V\VWHPV´$UW 
Availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality are classic information security goals or 
canons,34 or criteria used to assess the good level of security of network and information systems (as 
is authentication, referred to in Art. 4(30) of the PSD2).35 ,QWHJULW\LVWKHRSSRVLWHRI³WKHDFFLGHQWDORU
XQODZIXOGHVWUXFWLRQORVVDOWHUDWLRQ´DQGFRQILGHQWLDOLW\LVWKHRSSRVLWHRI³XQDXWKRULVHGGLVFORVXUH
RI RU DFFHVV´ FRQWDLQHG LQ WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI µGDWD EUHDFKHV¶ SURYLGHG E\ WKH H-Privacy Directive. 
According to the NIS Directive, information systems are either a (group of interconnected) device(s) 
which perform automatic processing of data pursuant to a program (Art. 4 (1)(b)), or digital data 
SURFHVVHGE\LQIRUPDWLRQV\VWHPVDQGQHWZRUNV³IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKHLURSHUDWLRQXVHSURWHFWLRQ
DQG PDLQWHQDQFH´ $UW F 7KLV GHILQLWLRQ KLJKOLJKWV WKH LQWHUUHODWHGQHVV EHWZHHQ GDWD
information systems, and networks. The latter are understood as an electronic communications 
QHWZRUN ZLWKLQ WKH PHDQLQJ RI $UW D RI )UDPHZRUN 'LUHFWLYH %ULHIO\ DQ µHOHFWURQLF
FRPPXQLFDWLRQV QHWZRUN¶ LV D WUDQVPLVVLRQ system, which permits the conveyance of signals, 
³LUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKHW\SHRILQIRUPDWLRQFRQYH\HG´QRWHWKDWµVLJQDOV¶DUHQRWGHILQHGLQWKHODZ36  
Based on this discussion, I can draw a first conclusion: given the near equivalence of networks 
in the NIS and Framework Directive,37  security incidents affecting networks should be similarly 
construed under both Directives. The same could be said for the PSD2, in that, based on the 
guidelines developed by the European Banking Agency (hereafter EBA) pursuant to Art. 96 (3) (a), an 
operational or sHFXULW\ LQFLGHQW LV RQH ³ZKLFK KDV RU ZLOO probably have an adverse impact on the 
                                                 
34
 International Telecommunication Union, Security in Telecommunications and Information Technology. 
An overview of issues and the deployment of existing ITU-T Recommendations for secure telecommunications 
,78 *HQHYD  (XURSHDQ 1HWZRUN DQG ,QIRUPDWLRQ 6HFXULW\ $JHQF\ (1,6$ µ*ORVVDU\¶ ENISA)  
<https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/threat-risk-management/risk-management/current-risk/risk-management-
inventory/glossary> accessed 2 February 2015. 
35
 8QGHUVWRRGDV³WKHSURSHUW\RIDVRXUFHEHLQJZKDWLWFODLPVWREH´European Banking Agency, Final 
Report on Guidelines on Major Incident Reporting under Directive (EU) 2015/2366 (PSD2). 
15EBA/GL/2017/10 (2017), p. 18. 
36
 Commission Implementing Regulation 2018/151 of 30 January 2018 laying down rules for application 
of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards further specification of 
the elements to be taken into account by digital service providers for managing the risks posed to the security of 
network and information systems and of the parameters for determining whether an incident has a substantial 
impact. OJ L 26/48. 
37
 Keeping aside the difference between the fact that the NIS Directive only refers to private networks. 
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integrity, availability, confidentiality, authenticity and/or continuity of payment-UHODWHG VHUYLFHV´38 
Moreover, given the understanding, in the NIS Directive, of information systems as (systems of) data, 
and network and information security as the preservation of, among others, integrity and 
confidentiality, I can draw a second conclusion. Accordingly, there is a convergence between 
µVHFXULW\LQFLGHQWV¶DQGµEUHDFKHVRIVHFXULW\¶39 irrespective of the fact that personal or non-personal 
data are affected, and irrespective of the service exposed to the breach. This conclusion is supported 
by the legislation itself, and the way in which it has been interpreted. For the legislation, suffice to 
take as an example RHFLWDO  RI WKH 1,6 'LUHFWLYH ZKHUHE\ ³SHUVRQDO GDWD DUH LQ PDQ\ FDVHV
FRPSURPLVHG DV D UHVXOW RI LQFLGHQWV´40 As for the interpretation of legislation,41 according to a 
survey run by the European Network and Information Security Agency (hereafter ENISA) with regard 
to the Framework Directive,42 the majority of respondents (54%) said that article 13a covers security 
of electronic communications together with Article 4 in the e-Privacy Directive (compared to 23% of 
those who thought Article 13a to be sufficient). This understanding finds its confirmation in technical 
circles: the Annex to the ISO/IEC Standard 29100 promotes the correspondence between privacy 
breaches and information security incidents.43 
Based on the above, I can define cyber security breachHVDV³DQHYHQWOHDGLQJWRWKH>DFFLGHQWDO
or] unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to [personal] data 
transmitted, stored or otherwise processed in connection with the provision of a given service offered 
by, or accessible via, network and information systems [or that compromises the availability, 
authenticity and authentication thereof]´7KHHOHPHQWVLQ square brackets are those that are not found 
across all definitions.  
/HW XV QRZ ORRN LQWR µORVV RI LQWHJULW\¶ ,Q PRVW QDWLRQDO ODZV WUDQVSRVLQJ WKH )UDPHZRUN
Directive,44 the expression was understood to mean loss of continuity, i.e. fruition of a service, due to 
causes other than the violation of information security canons. Hence, this interpretation is not 
compatible with the understanding of breach or incident I propose above. However, this 
understanding is not retained in the revised Art. 13a of the proposed EECC (Art. 40 in the current 
version), which KDVEHHQUHSKUDVHGWRDGGUHVV³DEUHDFKRIVHFXULW\WKDWKDVKDGDVLJQLILFDQWLPSDFW
RQ WKH RSHUDWLRQ RI QHWZRUNV RU VHUYLFHV´ ZKHUH VLJQLILFDQFH LV GHILQHG E\ WKH VDPH SDUDPHWHUV
introduced in the NIS Directive, see Section 3.2.2). However, a loss of continuity due to causes other 
than the violation of security canons affects availability of data and systems and integrity of data and 
addressing it contributes to the higher goal of Network and Information Security. In fact, Art. 2 (b) of 
Commission RegulaWLRQFODULILHVWKDWSK\VLFDOVHFXULW\VKRXOGEHSDUWRIDQ³DOO-hazard risk-
EDVHGDSSURDFK´45 In the PS'µRSHUDWLRQDO¶LQFLGHQWVDUHQRWFOHDUO\GLVWLQJXLVKHGIURPµVHFXULW\¶
                                                 
38
 European Banking Agency (2017), Guidelines on Major  Incident Reporting under SPD2, p. 18. This 
is also further corroborated by recitals 7 and 95 of the PSD2, which express elements of NIS as part of the EU 
cybersecurity policy. 
39
 This is further supported by the use of both expressions in the Framework and NIS Directive. 
40
 6HHDOVRUHFLWDORI WKH1,6'LUHFWLYHZKHUHE\³7KHVHFXULW\RIQHWZRUNDQG LQIRUPDWLRQV\VWHPV
comprises the security of stored, transmitted and pURFHVVHGGDWD´ 
41
 Furthermore, the Court of Justice of the European Union decided that the confidentiality of 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQVLVSDUWRIWKHHVVHQFHRIWKHULJKWWRUHVSHFWIRUSULYDWHDQGIDPLO\OLIHZKHUHDV³the security, 
confidentiality and integrity of that data´ LVSDUWRI WKHHVVHQFHRI WKHULJKW WR WKHSURWHFWLRQRISHUVRQDOGDWD
Respectively Judgment of 8 April 2014 in Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, Joined cases C-
293/12 and C-594/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, § 39; Opinion 1/15 of the Court (Grand Chamber), 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:592, § 150. 
42
 Dan Tofan, Konstantinos Moulinos and Christoffer Karsberg, Impact evaluation on the implementation 
of Article 13a incident reporting scheme within EU (European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA), 2015) p. 13. 
43
 International Organization for Standarization (ISO), International Standard ISO/IEC 29100:2011(E) 
Information technology ² Security techniques ² Privacy framework (2011). 
44
 European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), Annual Incident Reports 2016. 
Analysis of Article 13a annual incident reports in the telecom sector (2017). 
45
 Commission Implementing Regulation 2018/151 of 30 January 2018 laying down rules for application 
of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards further specification of 
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incidents. Yet, Annex 1 of the EBA guidelines contains an interesting definition of operational 
LQFLGHQWV DV ³VWHPPLQJ from inadequate or failed processes, people and systems or events of force 
majeure that affect the integrity, availability, confidentiality, authenticity and/or continuity of 
payment-UHODWHG VHUYLFHV´ 0RUHRYHU VHFXULW\ LQFLGHQWV PD\ VWHP IURP ³LQDGHTXDWH SK\VLFDO
VHFXULW\´46 These interpretations suggest that the notion of loss of continuity due to environmental 
elements (such as natural calamities, cables accidentally broken and human error) can be subsumed 
under the pursuit of NIS, which has a bearing on the goals that the instruments are trying to pursue, as 
I address in the next section. 
 
3.2. GOAL OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Based on the above, it becomes possible to conclude that the legal framework converges on the 
understanding of breach of security, and the overarching goal of addressing breaches as part of NIS, 
which, in turn, is a component of cybersecurity. This concerns the violation of security canons 
affecting information systems and networks (or engendering cybercrimes), in terms of the availability 
thereof, or the authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of (personal) information, or both. I 
corroborate this view in the first sub-section. Instruments diverge with respect to sector-specific 
threats to NIS, of which environmental elements can be part, and the harms that may ensue, which I 
discuss in the second sub-section. Fig. 1 exemplifies the hierarchy of goals and harms that the legal 
framework on cyber security breaches tries to address.  
 
Figure 1 Diagram on harms addressed by legislation on cyber security breaches 
 
3.2.1 The overarching cyber security goal of legislation pursuing breaches 
The finding that NIS is the primary concern of legislation addressing breaches is corroborated 
by an analysis of the articles in which rules on the notification and mitigation of cyber security y 
breaches are found. In all instruments reviewed here, rules on breaches are placed after provisions 
laying down an obligation to maintain the security of the service, namely: Art. 19(1) eIDAS 
Regulation; Art. 14(1) and 16(1) of the NIS Directive, the latter interpreted by Commission 
                                                                                                                                                        
the elements to be taken into account by digital service providers for managing the risks posed to the security of 
network and information systems and of the parameters for determining whether an incident has a substantial 
impact. OJ L 26/48. 
46
 European Banking Agency (2017), Guidelines on Major  Incident Reporting under SPD2, p. 41. 
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Regulation 2018/151;47 Art. 32(1) of the GDPR; Arts. 13(a)(1) and (2) of the Framework Directive; 
Arts. 1 and 1(a) of the e-Privacy Directive; and Art. 95 (1) of the PSD2. All those provisions express a 
risk-based approach, i.e. they require implementing technical and organisational measures to ensure a 
level of security appropriate to the risk.48 Furthermore, provisions on the notification of breaches are 
also preceded by rules aimed at preventing and mitigating breaches, namely Art. 19(1) of the eIDAS 
Regulation, Art. 14 (2) of the NIS Directive, Art. 32(1)(c) of the GDPR, Art. 13(a)(1) of the 
Framework Directive, and to some extent Art. 4(2) of the e-Privacy Directive. 
The structure of the articles under analysis, and the overarching goal they express, suggests that 
notifying a breach to a supervisory authority serves the ultimate goal of addressing harms to NIS, and 
hence cyber security7KLVFDQDOVREHHYLQFHGIURPWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VLPSDFWDVVHVVPHQW
of the GDPR referred to in the introduction, according to which the notification of data breaches 
VHUYHVWKHKLJKHVWSXUSRVHVRIµPXWXDOOHDUQLQJRQWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIVHFXULW\PHDVXUHV¶µSXEOLF
DZDUHQHVV¶ DQG µVHOI-LPSURYHPHQW¶ LQ WKH DUHD RI LQIRUPDWLRQ VHFXULW\ 6RPH RI WKH LQVWUXPHQWV
explicitly refer to these goals in their recitals, as illustrated in Table 1. Each column refers to one of 
the six instruments, whereas each row refers to one of the goals of notification.  
 e-Privacy Framework eIDAS NIS GDPR PSD2 
Mutual learning    Recitals 
33 and 34 
  
Public 
awareness 
Recital 20  Recital 
38 
Recital 40 
and 49 
Recital 
87 
Recital 
91 
Self-improvement Recital 20   Recital 4 Recital 
87 
Recital 
91 
Table 1 Recitals of legislation and the three goals of notification 
 
3.2.2 Secondary (risks of) damage of cyber security 
As discussed above, legislation on breaches aims at either avoiding or reducing the risk of 
GDPDJHWR1,6,QWXUQPDLQWDLQLQJ1,6KHOSVDYRLGLQJµVHFRQGDU\¶KDUPVWKDWDUHH[SUHVVHGLQWKH
form of risks. Burdon et al.49 noted that, while the e-3ULYDF\'LUHFWLYHGRHVQRWTXDOLI\WKHULVNVµIor 
SHUVRQDOGDWDDQGSULYDF\¶5HFLWDO5HFLWDORIWKH&LWL]HQV¶'LUHFWLYHOLVWVWKHULVNVWKDWFRXOG
ensue where a data breach is not addressed in an appropriate and timely manner. Those risks have 
been transposed into the GDPR. Recital 8550 refers to ³SK\VLFDOPDWHULDORUQRQ-material damage to 
natural persons such as loss of control over their personal data or limitation of their rights, 
discrimination, identity theft or fraud, financial loss, unauthorised reversal of pseudonymisation, 
damage to reputation, loss of confidentiality of personal data protected by professional secrecy or any 
other significant economic or social disadvantage to the natural person conceUQHG´ 0RUHRYHU WKH
GDPR distinguishes between different at least five types of risk to the rights and freedoms of natural 
persons that may lead to damage (Recital 75). The first are generic risks. The second are low risks, as 
                                                 
47
 Art. (2) of the Regulation provides very useful guidance for the understanding of the security 
requirements. Even though this provision addresses digital service providers (as defined in Section 1.2 and 
further discussed in Section 5), it could be used, by analogy, in relation to other services. 
48
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Statement on the Role of a Risk-based Approach in Data 
Protection Legal Frameworks (14/EN WP 218, 2014); European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA), Risk Management: Implementation principles and Inventories for Risk Management/Risk Assessment 
methods and tools 5DSKDsO*HOOHUWµ'DWD3URWHFWLRQDULVNUHJXODWLRQ"%HWZHHQWKHULVNPDQDJHPHQWRI
HYHU\WKLQJDQGWKHSUHFDXWLRQDU\DOWHUQDWLYH¶,QWHUQDWLonal Data Privacy Law 3-19. 
49
 %XUGRQ/DQHDQGYRQ1HVVHQµ'DWDEUHDFKQRWLILFDWLRQODZLQWKH(8DQG$XVWUDOLD - Where 
WRQRZ"¶ 
50
 However, consider that UHFLWDORIWKH&LWL]HQV¶'LUHFWLYHDQG5HFLWDORIWKH*'35differ. 
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in the case of pseudonymised data (Art. 4(5) of the GDPR). The third are significant risks, as in the 
case of special categories of data, a.k.a. sensitive data (Recital 51). The fourth are high risks, which 
are those that follow a specific assessment, e.g. in relation to data breaches or new technologies.51 The 
last, but certainly not least, are data security risks (Recital 83).  
Specific risks mentioned in the eIDAS Regulation are financial risks for the trust providers 
(Recital 37), the risk of loss, theft, damage or any unauthorised alterations to data transmitted via an 
electronic registered delivery service (Art. 3(36)); risk of misuse or alteration of identity (Art. 8 
(2)(a)). 
The PSD2 refers to risks relating to security (arguably in terms of information security canons, 
Recital  LQFOXGLQJ ³IUDXG DQG LOOHJDO XVH RI VHQVLWLYH DQG SHUVRQDO GDWD $UW. 5 (1) (j)), e.g. 
³SKLVKLQJ´ 5HFLWDO  DQG ³XQDXWKRUL]HG DFFHVV WR WKH SD\PHQW DFFRXQW´ 5HFLWDO  7KH
guidelines issued by the EBA that concern the criteria establishing whether a breach should be 
notified can also be seen as risks. These are: transactions affected; payment service users affected; 
service downtime; economic impact; level of internal escalation; payment service providers or 
relevant infrastructures potentially affected; and reputational impact.52 
7KH1,6'LUHFWLYHGHVFULEHVULVNVDV³DQ\UHDVRQDEO\LGHQWLILDEOHFLUFXPVWDQFHRUHYHQWKDYLQJ
D SRWHQWLDO DGYHUVH HIIHFW RQ WKH VHFXULW\ RI QHWZRUN DQG LQIRUPDWLRQ V\VWHPV´ $UW 
Methodologies to quantify harm are scant. If one discounts references to risk in the banking and 
financial sectors, the rules that concern the criteria establishing whether a breach should be notified 
contained in Arts. 6, 14 and 16 (and discussed later) offer a proxy for calculating the damage. The 
entity of damage depends on: (a) the number of users affected by the incident; (b) the duration of the 
incident; (c) the geographical spread with regard to the area affected by the incident; (d) the extent of 
the disruption of the functioning of the service; (e) the extent of the impact on economic and societal 
activities. These criteria have been copied into the EECC (thus redressing the shortcoming of the 
Framework Directive).53  
The risks expounded can be associated with harms/damage to natural persons, and 
harms/damage to the services and society, as exemplified in Table 2. 
RISKS NATURAL PERSONS SERVICES (AND BEYOND) 
TYPE OF 
DAMAGE 
 Generic, significant, high, security Security and continuity of services 
MATERIAL 
DAMAGE 
x Fraud 
x Financial loss 
x Other significant economic 
disadvantage 
x Number of users affected by 
incident 
x Economic impact 
x Other service providers or relevant 
infrastructures potentially affected 
x Extent of impact on economic and 
societal activities and public safety 
PHYSICAL 
DAMAGE 
x Mental health 
x Physical health 
x Loss of life 
x Extent of disruption of the 
functioning of the service; 
x Duration of incident 
x Geographical spread with regard to 
                                                 
51
 7KHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQµVLJQLILFDQW¶DQGµhigh¶ risks is not immediately apparent; based on an analysis 
of the relevant provisions, significance seems to concern the intensity of the damage that individuals may suffer 
IURPZKHUHDVµKLJK¶VHHPVWRFRQFHUQ the likelihood of the damage. An in-depth analysis of the notion of risk 
in the GDPR is beyond the scope of this paper. However, see the work of Raphaël Gellert, mentioned supra, fn. 
47. 
52
 European Banking Agency (2017), Guidelines on Major  Incident Reporting under SPD2, pp. 20-21. 
53
 Art. 3 of Commission Regulation 2018/151 lays down parameters to determine whether the impact is 
substantial. In relation to paragraph (a), it indicates the number of contracted natural or legal persons, or the 
number of affected users based on traffic data. 
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the area affected by the incident 
NON-
MATERIAL 
DAMAGE 
x Alteration, theft or misuse of identity 
x Damage to reputation 
x humiliation 
x other significant social disadvantage 
x Reputational impact 
x Extent of impact on economic and 
societal activities and public safety 
 
RIGHTS x Loss of control over personal data 
x Limitation of rights 
x Discrimination 
x Unauthorised reversal of 
pseudonymisation 
x Loss of confidentiality of personal 
data protected by professional secrecy  
x Other service providers or relevant 
infrastructures potentially affected 
x Extent of impact on economic and 
societal activities and public safety 
 
  
Table 2 Summary of instrument-specific harms of cyber security breaches  
These may seem to pave the way for multiple combinations of security, continuity and impact 
on natural and legal persons, as well as society. None of the instruments suggests directly how risks, 
and related damages, are to be calculated. In some cases, further rules supplement primary legislation; 
this is the case of implementing acts, e.g. Regulation 2018/151 concerning Art. 16 of the NIS 
Directive, and of binding guidelines, e.g. those specifying art. 96 of the PSD2.54 In the Telecom 
sector, bodies such as the ENISA,55 and the Article 29 Working Party56 have provided non-binding 
examples of risks in relation to breaches. However, no cross-sectorial initiative exists.57 The private 
sector has filled in the gap, be it in the form of privately financed studies, such as the one run by the 
Ponemon Institute,58 or cyber-insurance59 that, according to ENISA, has thus far limited adoption 
compared to other sectors, but may quickly develop with the entry into force of the GDPR and NIS 
Directives.60 As a result, even though the instruments61 and regulatory authorities62 acknowledge the 
overlap between the risks to personal and non-personal data, and the fact that breaches can be 
triggered by cybercrime, there does not seem to be any methodology to survey the combined effect of 
cyber security breaches across the different sectors.  
 
3.3. MECHANISMS TO MANAGE CYBER SECURITY BREACHES 
In order to counter the harms, threats and risks, legislation relies on three approaches: first, the 
adoption of appropriate technical and organizational measures to counter the breach; second, 
notification of breaches that are likely to harm; and third, additional tools. Since I discussed the 
adoption of appropriate technical and organizational measures in Section 3.2.1, therefore here I focus 
on the remaining two approaches. 
                                                 
54
 European Banking Agency (2017), Guidelines on Major  Incident Reporting under SPD2. 
55
 European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), Technical Guideline on Security 
measures for Article 4 and Article 13a (2014). 
56
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document 01/2011 on the Current EU Personal 
Data Breach Framework and Recommendations for Future Policy Developments (WP 184) (2011). 
57
 Attempts are being made at a higher level of abstraction, which, however, does not embrace privacy 
rights. A methodology to measure cyber harm was proposed in Agrafiotis and others (2016), Cyber Harm: 
Concepts, Taxonomy and Measurement.   
58
 The report covers direct and indirect costs of a personal data breach, both during the crisis and to 
mitigate the damages suffered by individuals. Ponemon (2017), 2017 Cost of Data Breach Study. Global 
Overview. 
59
 See, for instance, the policy offered by Zurich: https://www.zurich.com/en/products-and-
services/protect-your-business/what-we-protect/cyber-risk (last accessed 19th December 2017).  
60
 European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), Cyber Insurance: Recent Advances, 
Good Practices and Challenges (2016). 
61
 E.g. Recital 63 of the NIS Directive. 
62
 Tofan, Moulinos and Karsberg (2015). 
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3.3.1 Notification 
All breached parties must notify the breach to the national regulatory/supervisory authority 
cRPSHWHQW IRUHDFKLQVWUXPHQW+RZHYHUQRWLILFDWLRQ LVµFRQGLWLRQDO¶ LQ WKDWRQO\EUHDFKHVWKDWDUH
likely to cause harm to individuals or to services, as discussed in Section 3.2.2, must be notified. This 
results from, and further feeds into, the incoherence of the concept of notification described by 
Burdon et al (Section 1).63 There is no obligation to notify the regulatory/supervisory authority if the 
breach is either unlikely to result in an appreciable risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons 
(Article 33 GDPR), 64  for instance because of the adoption of ad hoc or post hoc measures of 
protection,65 or if the provision of a service is not significantly, substantially, or majorly impacted 
(Articles 13a(3) of the Framework Directive, 19 (2) of the eIDAS Regulation, 96 (1) of the PSD2, and 
14 (3) and 16 (11) of the NIS Directive). +HQFHµVLJQLILFDQFH¶LHVLJQLILFDQWVXEVWDQWLDOPDMRUDQG
µULVN¶DUHWKHGLVFULPLQDWLQJFULWHULDLQQRWLILFDWLRQ 
Unfortunately, however, as noted earlier the six instruments do not always provide metrics to 
evaluate the level of harm.66 7KH)UDPHZRUN'LUHFWLYHGRHVQRWFODULI\ZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVDµVLJQLILFDQW¶
impact; ENISA has elaborated some criteria67  to assess the significance, which are however not 
mandatory. 0RUHRYHU ³GHSHQGLQJRQ WKHQDWLRQDO LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI$UW D LI RQH LQFLGHQWGRHV
not affect the continuity of the service (availability), although confidentiality or integrity might be 
DIIHFWHGWKHLQFLGHQWGRHVQRWQHHGWREHUHSRUWHG´68  
In the NIS Directive, the significance of a disruptive effect depends on the factors listed in Art. 
6 (1) and the nature of the essential service, as exemplified by Recital 28. For the health sector, for 
instance, significance depends on ³WKHQXPEHURISDWLHQWVXnder the provider's care per year. As for 
water production, significance depends on processing and supply, the volume and number and types 
of users supplied, including, for example, hospitals, public service organisations, or individuals, and 
the existence RI DOWHUQDWLYH VRXUFHV RI ZDWHU WR FRYHU WKH VDPH JHRJUDSKLFDO DUHD´ 7KH QHZO\
established Cooperation Group is to issue guidelines on the notification of incidents by operators of 
essential services (Art. 14 (7)).69 Pursuant to Commission Regulation 2018/151 (Art. 4 ), an incident 
is substantial when: the service was unavailable for five million user-hours; 100 000 users suffered 
from loss of integrity, authenticity or confidentiality of data processed by the digital service provider; 
the incident put at risk public safety, public security or the life of individuals; and at least one user has 
suffered from material damage in excess of one million Euros. The Regulation, however, is silent 
about the case of an incident to a digital service used in the context of essential services, which I 
discuss later in Section 5.  
                                                 
63
 %XUGRQ/DQHDQGYRQ1HVVHQµ'DWDEUHDFKQRWLILFDWLRQODZLQWKH(8DQG$XVWUDOLD - Where 
WRQRZ"¶ 
64
 The exception is represented by the e-Privacy Directive, where Telcos must always notify a breach 
relating to an individual or a subscriber; this exception is however bound to disappear with the overhaul of the e-
Privacy Directive. 
65
 Commission Regulation 611/2013/EU of 24 June 2013 on the Measures Applicable to the Notification 
of Personal Data Breaches under Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Privacy and Electronic Communications (Commission Regulation on Data Breaches); Burdon, Lane and von 
1HVVHQµ'DWDEUHDFKQRWLILFDWLRQODZLQWKH(8DQG$XVWUDOLD- :KHUHWRQRZ"¶ 
66
 The situation may be further complicated by differences resulting from the national transposition of the 
instruments. 
67
 Tofan, Moulinos and Karsberg (2015). 
68
 European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) (2017), Annual Incident Reports 2016. 
Analysis of Article 13a annual incident reports in the telecom sector, p. 10. 
69
 European Commission, Making the most of NIS ± towards the effective implementation of Directive 
(EU) 2016/1148 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems 
across the Union. Annex to (Communication) COM(2017) 476 final/2 (2017), pp. 26-30. 
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The proposed EECC lists five mandatory criteria that have been derived from the NIS 
Directive, but even there, RIILFLDOJXLGDQFHLVQHHGHGWRHQIRUFHDFRQVLVWHQWQRWLRQRIµVLJQLILFDQFH¶
Similarly, WRWKHDERYHWKHH,'$65HJXODWLRQGRHVQRWGHILQHWKHNH\WHUPVµVLJQLILFDQW¶RUµUHOLDEOH¶
used in the notification clauses.70  
In the case of data breaches, criteria to assess the impact on the rights to data protection and 
SULYDWHOLIH µprivacy rights¶ IRUVKRUW were developed by the Article 29 Working Party;71 however, 
there is no evidence as to the extent to which they were implemented. Under the GDPR, it is the 
National Data Protection Authority that assesses the likelihood of adverse consequences for data 
subjects, and can thus still request data controllers to communicate the data breach to affected 
individuals irrespective of the conditions illustrated above (Art. 34 (4)).  
The PSD2 represents an understandable exception, given the longer experience of the banking 
sector in elaborating cost-benefit analyses and the fact that financial loss is, possibly, easier to 
TXDQWLI\ ,Q IDFW WKH (%$¶V JXLGHOLQHV SURYLGH D PRUH QXDQFHG understanding of the notion of 
µLQFLGHQW¶WKDQRWKHULQVWUXPHQWVWKLVLVEDVHGRQDFRPELQDWLRQRIVHYHQFULWHULDZKLFKDUHTXDQWLILHG
in absolute and relative terms, and distinguished between lower and higher impact.72 A major incident 
depends on the presence of either at least one criterion on the higher-level side of the impact 
spectrum,73 or at least three criteria on the lower level side of the impact spectrum.74 Notification by 
the payment service provider, which is also due when a low-key incident becomes major as defined 
above, can be delegated to third parties by means of contracts. Once notified, the competent 
(supervisory) authority is to further assess the significance of the incident so as to notify relevant 
national authorities (Art. 96 (1) second indent), as well as the EBA and the European Central Bank 
(Art. 96 (2)). 
Some instruments require notifying supervisory authorities other than the ones responsible for a 
given sector, such as data protection authorities, or law enforcement authorities (Articles 13a(3) of the 
Framework Directive and 19(2) of the eIDAS Regulation). When a breach is likely to include two or 
more Member States, notification should also be made to the responsible authority of the other 
Member State and the ENISA (Articles 13a(3) of the Framework Directive and 19(2) of the eIDAS 
Regulation). Pursuant to Art. 96 (2) of the PSD2, the notified competent (supervisory) authority shall 
notify national authorities that may be affected, the EBA and the European Central Bank, which in 
turn will assess whether the incident affects more than one Member country (and notifies 
accordingly). 
Moreover, breached parties must notify natural persons, usually when the rights of natural 
persons are likely to be adversely affected by the breach (Articles 4 of the e-Privacy Directive and 19 
(2) of the eIDAS Regulation), or there is a high risk thereof (Art. 34(1) GDPR); if the service provider 
satisfactorily demonstrates that he or she had applied technological protection measures to the 
                                                 
70
 For the standard form, see Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1984 of 3 November 2015 
defining the circumstances, formats and procedures of notification pursuant to Article 9(5) of Regulation (EU) 
No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for 
electronic transactions in the internal market (notified under document C(2015) 7369). 
71
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2011), Working Document 01/2011 on the Current EU 
Personal Data Breach Framework and Recommendations for Future Policy Developments (WP 184). 
72
 See in particular table at p. 23 and Annex 1 in European Banking Agency (2017), Guidelines on Major  
Incident Reporting under SPD2. 
73
 These are: the affected transactions (more than 25% of the regular level of transactions or five million 
EUR); the affected payment service users (more than fifty thousand or 25% of the service users), the economic 
impact (more than Max. or more than five million EUR); and level of internal escalation whereby a crisis mode 
is likely to be called upon. 
74
 These are: the affected transactions (more than 10% of the regular level of transactions, or one hundred 
thousand EUR); more than five thousand and 10% of users of the payment service; a service downtime of more 
than 2 hours; a high level of internal escalation; the possibility of affecting other service providers and their 
infrastructure; and reputational impact. 
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breached data, then he or she does not have to notify the breach.75 Under the eIDAS Regulation, legal 
persons must also be notified. Payment service users must be notified if the incident has or may have 
an impact on their financial interests (Art. 96 (1) of the PSD2). 
Finally, most instruments foresee that, if the authority believes that disclosure of the breach is 
in the public interest, it may either inform the public, or require the breached party to do so (Articles 
13a(3) of the Framework Directive, 19(2) of the eIDAS Regulation and 16(7) of the NIS Directive). 
Disclosure to the public may also be seen as an alternative for disclosing the breach to individuals, 
when doing so is either disproportionate, or if otherwise the risk of damage is very low due to the 
adoption of either ex ante measures such as encryption, or of ex post measures of mitigation (Art. 34 
 *'35 1RWLILFDWLRQ WR WKH SXEOLF ³DERXW LQGLYLGXDO LQFLGHQWV´ PD\ DOVR RFFXU ³ZKHUH SXEOLF
awareness is necessary in order to prevent an incident or to deal ZLWKDQRQJRLQJLQFLGHQW´XQGHUWKH
NIS Directive. 
Instruments also differ as to the time that can incur between discovering the breach and 
reporting it. The most stringent requirement is contained in the guidelines issued by the EBA on the 
PSD2, whereby payment services providers must initially notify the incident to the competent 
authority four hours after it was first detected, and provide two additional follow-up on reports.76 
These requirements are followed by the eIDAS Regulation, according to which data breaches must be 
notified within 24 hours, and by the GDPR (72 hours), whereas the e-Privacy and NIS Directives use 
WKHEODQGHUH[SUHVVLRQµZLWKRXWXQGXHGHOD\¶ 
 
3.3.2 Inventories, liability and sanctions 
The last of three mechanisms put in place by the six instruments to counter harms of breaches 
are inventories, liability and sanctions.  
Several instruments require keeping inventories of the notification of breaches received. The 
requirements, however, vary from instrument to instrument. Sometimes the inventory must simply be 
NHSW E\ WKH VHUYLFHV IRU WKH VDNH RI WKH VXSHUYLVRU\ DXWKRULW\¶V UHFRUG $UW  RI WKH H-Privacy 
Directive). In other cases, WKH QDWLRQDO DXWKRULW\ PXVW VHQG HDFK \HDU D µVXPPDU\ UHSRUW¶ RQ WKH
notifications received, either to the Commission (Articles 13(a)(3)) Framework Directive and 17(6) of 
the eIDAS Regulation) and ENISA, or to the Cooperation Group in anonymised form (Art. 10(3) of 
the NIS Directive), and explain the actions taken to mitigate the breaches (Framework Directive). As 
for the GDPR, pursuant to Article 33(5), the controller must document any personal data breaches, 
comprising the facts relating to the personal data breach, its effects and the remedial action taken, so 
that the supervisory authority can verify compliance.  
The six instruments differ sharply on the question of liability, with the exception, perhaps, of 
the fact that mostly the laws relate to services, which enjoy a different liability regime than that 
applicable to goods.77 Explicit rules are contained in the GDPR, the eIDAS Regulation and the PSD2.  
In the GDPR, there are two provisions relevant to liability. The first is the principle of the 
accountability of the controller, i.e. the party who decides the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data, alone or jointly with another controller (Art. 4(7)). Accountability means that a 
controller is responsible for, and able to demonstrate compliance with the principles relating to the 
processing of personal data contained in Art. 5 (Art. 5(2)). The effect of this principle is taking a first 
                                                 
75
 E.g. as defined in Commission Regulation 611/2013/EU on Data Breaches. 
76
 European Banking Agency (2017), Guidelines on Major Incident Reporting under SPD2, pp. 24-27. 
77
 On this point, see European Commission, Building a European Data Economy ((Communication) 
COM(2017) 9 final, 2017). The Commission is due to publish an appraisal of the Directive on liability for 
defective products in mid-2018 European Commission, Mid-Term Review on the implementation of the Digital 
Single Market Strategy. A Connected Digital Single Market for All ((Communication) COM(2017) 228 final, 
(Staff Working Document) SWD(2017) 155 final, 2017), p.11. 
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step towards the inversion of the burden of proof. The controller(s) are exempt from liability under the 
GDPR only if they prove that they are not in any way responsible for the event giving rise to the 
damage. Otherwise, the second set of provisions, contained in Art. 82 (to be read in the light of 
5HFLWDO  DSSO\ QDPHO\ ³DQ\ FRQWUROOHU LQYROYHG LQ SURFessing shall be liable for the damage 
FDXVHGE\SURFHVVLQJZKLFKLQIULQJHVWKLV5HJXODWLRQ´$VIRUSURFHVVRUVLHWKHPDWHULDOH[HFXWRU
RI WKHSURFHVVLQJRQEHKDOIRI WKH FRQWUROOHU $UW  WKH\DUH ³OLDEOH IRU WKHGDPDJHFDXVHGE\
processing only where it has not complied with obligations of this Regulation specifically directed to 
SURFHVVRUVRUZKHUHLWKDVDFWHGRXWVLGHRUFRQWUDU\WRODZIXOLQVWUXFWLRQVRIWKHFRQWUROOHU´$UW
This suggests that liability may apply with or without intention, i.e. also for negligence. 
Article 13 of the eIDAS Regulation lays down clear rules for trust service providers. Trust 
service providers are liable for damages arising from the use of their services, provided this was 
within the contractual limitations (Recital 37), caused by either intention or negligence, but the burden 
of proof lies with the natural or legal person claiming the damage. Recital 67 clarifies that website 
authentication services shall be bound by minimal security and liability obligations. The intention or 
negligence of qualified trust service providers is presumed, and the burden of proof is inverted. 
Hence, to address the risk of liability for damage, qualified service providers must either maintain 
adequate financial resources, or take out appropriate liability insurance, or both. Recital 37 clarifies 
that these rules should be given effect in accordance with national rules on liability. As for e-
identification, Art. 11 lays down that the notifying Member State, the party issuing the electronic 
identification means and the party operating the authentication procedure, should be liable for failure 
to comply with the relevant obligations under the Regulation, in accordance with national rules on 
liability (including the burden of proof, Recital 18). 
The PSD2 establishes the principle that each payment service provider is liable for the portion 
of a transaction that it enables (Art. 92 and Recital 87). Articles 72²74 address the case of 
unauthorized payment transactions. Pursuant to Art. 73, the payment service provider must refund in 
full the payer who has suffered from, and has correctly notified, an unauthorized payment transaction 
(with the possible exception of an excess of 50 EUR); further compensation may be due on the basis 
of contractual arrangements between the provider and the payer. In such a case, and when the payer 
FODLPVWKDWDSD\PHQWWUDQVDFWLRQZDVQRWFRUUHFWO\H[HFXWHG³LWLVIRUWKHSD\PHQWVHUYLFHSURYLGHU
[or the payment initiation provider] to prove that the payment transaction was authenticated, 
accurately recorded, entered in the accounts and not affected by a technical breakdown or some other 
GHILFLHQF\ RI WKH VHUYLFH SURYLGHG E\ WKH SD\PHQW VHUYLFH SURYLGHU´ $UW   7KH SURYLGHU LV
exempted from these rules LILW³KDVUHDVRQDEOHJURXQGVIRUVXVSHFWLQJIUDXGDQGFRPPXQLFDWHVWKRVH
JURXQGVWRWKHUHOHYDQWQDWLRQDODXWKRULW\LQZULWLQJ´RULIWKHSD\HUIDLOVWRIXOILOLWVREOLJDWLRQVXQGHU
Art. 69 (on personalised security credentials) due to intent or gross negligence. However, pursuant to 
Art. 72 (2), it is for the payment service provider (or the payment initiation service provider) to 
³SURYLGHVXSSRUWLQJHYLGHQFHWRSURYHIUDXGRUJURVVQHJOLJHQFHRQSDUWRIWKHSD\PHQWVHUYLFHXVHU´
This, similarly to the GDPR, provides a step in the direction of a reversed burden of proof. 
Furthermore, some categories of payment service providers (payment information services and 
account information services under Art. 5, and payment institutions under Art. 10) are expected to 
take up professional indemnity insurance to fulfil the safeguarding requirements. 
The e-Privacy Directive refers to the liability contained in the Data Protection Directive, 
whereas the Framework Directive does not address the matter. The NIS Directive contains an explicit 
reference to the fact that there should be no increased liability attached to the notification of breaches 
of security ± in fact, the reporting done by the single point of contact to the Cooperation Group is 
supposed to be anonymous. ,QWHUHVWLQJO\5HFLWDOFODULILHV WKDW³KDUGZDUHDQGVRIWZDUHSURGXFWV
DUHDOUHDG\VXEMHFWWRH[LVWLQJUXOHVRQSURGXFWOLDELOLW\´ 
On the matter of sanctions, the GDPR is the only instrument foreseeing a homogeneous system 
of administrative fines, proportional to the degree of intention, negligence, and gravity of the 
RPLVVLRQZKLFKFDQDPRXQWWRXSWR¼RURIWKHWRWDOZRUOGZLGHDQQXDOWXUQRYHURI
the fined party (Art. 83). The GDPR leaves to Member States the establishment of other penalties for 
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infringements, which are not subject to administrative fines (Art. 84). The e-Privacy Directive refers 
to sanctions contained in the Data Protection Directive, which is implemented at the national level and 
allows imposing pecuniary fines and sanctions of various types. All other instruments refer to the 
need for identifying effective and dissuasive penalties (art. 16 of the eIDAS Regulation, art. 21 of the 
NIS Regulation, and Art. 21 of the Framework Directive), but leave the matter in the hand of the 
Member States, or contracts (PSD2). 
 
4. Assessing the regulatory framework on cyber security breaches 
The goal of part 3 was to compare and contrast the instruments that make up the regulatory 
patchwork of cyber security breaches. Here I set to answer the research question. The sole instruments 
that can be properly appraised individually, because sufficient time has elapsed, and data have been 
collected, are those adopted in the first regulatory wave, i.e. the Framework and e-Privacy Directives. 
Based on the lessons learnt, I subsequently propose a benchmark to evaluate the regulatory framework 
at the higher level of abstraction (Section 4.2). Subsequently, I illustrate how each individual 
instrument, as well as the whole framework, fares in relation to the benchmark (Section 4.3). I then 
discuss the implications of my findings (Section 4.4). 
 
4.1 LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE FIRST REGULATORY WAVE  
4.1.2 The Framework Directive 
The ENISA has published a number of papers assessing the impact of the norms on breaches ± 
both in relation to security incidents, and loss of integrity (availability) ± by means of data collected 
through regulatory authorities. 
As for availability, the regulatory authorities report that the Directive has attained 100% with 
respect to continuity/availability or disruption/outages of electronic communications networks and 
services.78 Interestingly, only 5.1% (34) of the total number of incidents in 2016 was caused by 
malicious actions (a figure doubled compared to 2015), as opposed to 71% caused by system failures 
(hardware-related, and software bugs), 12.7 by human error,79 and 5.1 by natural causes.80 Denial of 
service attacks only accounted for 3% of incidents, and network traffic hijack for 1%. As ENISA 
H[SODLQV³7KHSURSRUWLRQRI«F\EHUVHFXULW\UHODWHG LQFLGHQWVDPRQJWKH WRWDOQXPEHURI LQFLGHQWV
reported remains low due to the focus of the [transposition of the]81 recurrent regulation on the 
³DYDLODELOLW\´ RI VHUYLFHV DQG QHWZRUNV PHDQLQJ PRVWO\ GLVUXSWLRQV´ 82  In fact, as anticipated in 
Section 3.1, only a minority of national laws (20%) oblige reporting breaches affecting information 
confidentiality, or denial of service attacks not necessarily affecting the availability of the electronic 
communications.83 ENISA noted that the number of malware-related attacks may be on the rise, in 
line with the results of statistics worldwide.84  
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79
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 µ(QHPLHV ZLWKLQ 5HGHILQLQJ WKH LQVLGHU WKUHDW LQ
RUJDQL]DWLRQDOVHFXULW\SROLF\¶3RQHPRQ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Analysis of Article 13a annual incident reports in the telecom sector, p. 29. 
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Despite their small reported incidence, malware-related incidents had the greatest impact: they 
last the longest (90 hours), and consequently entailed the highest number of user hours lost (81500).85 
The cost of insecurity appears therefore high ± but how did the transposed Directive fare in terms of 
security? One fourth of the responding regulatory authorities believe that the requirements contained 
in Article 13a of the Framework Directive did not lead to stronger security measures; 45% declared 
not to know what impact the Directive had had on security,86 a figure that appears disconcerting in 
itself, and all the more if compared with the 100% on disruption of service mentioned earlier.  
The main challenges that regulatory authorities report having faced when they supported 
providers in the implementation of security measures could offer an explanation as to this result. The 
biggest challenges were the reluctance of some of the providers in implementing the new regulations 
(27%), followed by available budget and the administrative burden (25%), and the limited value for 
PRQH\ DV DQ RXWFRPH RI WKH RYHUDOO SURFHVV  (1,6$ UHSRUWV WKDW ³DQRWKHU FKDOOHQJH LQ WKH
implementation process of the security measures has to do with the lack of precision in the definition 
RIµFULWLFDODVVHWV¶DQGRWKHUNH\FRQFHSWVVXFKDVµDSSURSULDWHOHYHORIVHFXULW\¶´87 In the same report, 
(1,6$QRWHVWKDW³LWLVGLIILFXOW WROLQNWKHLPSURYHPHQWRIVHFXULW\PHDsures with the evolution of 
WKH QXPEHU RI LQFLGHQWV H[SHULHQFHG´88 but on the bright side, the implementation of Art. 13a has 
LPSURYHGWKHVHFXULW\RIVPDOOHURUOHVVDGYDQFHGRSHUDWRUVSUHYLRXVO\QHHGLQJ³WHFKQLFDODVVLVWDQFH
and know-KRZ´89 
The difficulty in assessing the success of the Framework Directive in improving the state of 
network and information security of Telcos has partly to do with the restricted and, arguably 
incomplete, transposition of the obligations contained in Art. 13(a)(1). However, the indeterminate 
impact of the Directive is per se an important outcome. The current state of implementation of the 
Directive fails to build on the complementarity (mentioned supra) with the e-Privacy Directive 
highlighted by 54% of national regulatory authorities.90 
 
4.1.2. The e-Privacy Directive 
Assessing the e-Privacy Directive appears to be even more complex than the Framework 
Directive. Since supervisory authorities are not required to maintain a record or inventory of the 
breaches, no comprehensive data is available. Early assessments of the e-Privacy Directive, such as 
the report conducted for the European Commission by Kosta and Dumortier,91 do not cover the issue 
of data breaches.  
Annex 8 of the Impact Assessment of the proposed GDPR contains the results of consultations 
run with SMEs,92 ZKHUHE\³PRVWUHVSRQGHQWVKDYHQHYHUH[SHULHQFHGDGDWDEUHDFK$PRQJ
the 7.1% of SMEs that state having experienced breaches, 1.6% related to data being lost, 2.1% stolen 
DQG  PLVXVHG«$PRQJ WKH 60(V WKDt experienced breaches, roughly half (i.e. 3.9% of SMEs 
consulted) informed the individuals whose data were affected by breaches, whereas the other half did 
not. Regarding the cost of the notification to affected individuals, respondents indicated that the 
QRWLILFDWLRQFRVWOHVVWKDQ¼IRURI60(VFRQVXOWHGLQWKHUDQJH¼-1000 (for 0.5%), in 
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WKH UDQJH ¼- IRU  DQG LQ WKH UDQJH ¼-5000 for only one single respondent 
´93 
In the impact assessment accompanying the proposed e-Privacy Regulation, the Commission 
reported, based on information collected by Deloitte,94 that very few Member States have shared 
information on data breaches,95 notably the UK and Ireland. According to the assessment performed 
by Deloitte on behalf of the Commission,96 the e-Privacy Directive has only been partly effective, 
efficient, relevant and coherent, though there is room for improvement because the instrument has 
added value due to the transnational effect of data breaches.97 
This brief survey does not allow drawing conclusions concerning the ability of the e-Privacy 
and Framework Directives to avoid harms specific to individuals and services in the Telecom Sector, 
let alone avoid harms to NIS. Such outcome calls for the need of a specific methodology. 
 
4.2. A BENCHMARK FOR APPRAISING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Earlier I introduced the three advantages of breach notification identified by the European 
Commission.98 , GXEEHG WKHVH WKUHH DGYDQWDJHVRIQRWLILFDWLRQDV µPXWXDO OHDUQLQJ HIIHFWLYHQHVVRI
securiW\ PHDVXUHV¶ µSXEOLF DZDUHQHVV¶ DQG µVHOI-LPSURYHPHQW¶ LQ WKH DUHD RI QHWZRUN DQG
information security. The fact that these goals were suggested in the context of the GDPR makes them 
a suitable benchmark to assess the adequacy of the framework in relation to personal data breaches. 
However, since the three goals of breach notification explicitly refer to the overarching goal of all six 
instruments, i.e. NIS, therefore I suggest they may be used to assess the performance of the legal 
framework on cyber security breaches. In order to use these goals as a benchmark, it is necessary to 
give them substance. To do so, I experimentally rely on legislation, policy documents and literature. 
Some of the sub-goals are relevant for more than one goal, as illustrated in Table 3 below. 
 
MUTUAL 
LEARNING 
AWARENESS  SELF-IMPROVEMENT  
Inventories based on complete and consistent data 
collection, including reference to technology 
Coherent regime on liability for 
personal data 
Consistent notification, including standard timing Coherent regime on burden of proof 
Threat-sharing exercise 
 
Effective supervision Incentives for the implementation of 
security measures, including 
sanctions and rewards 
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 Deloitte, Evaluation and review of Directive 2002/58 on privacy and the electronic communication 
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 European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation on 
Privacy and Electronic Communications ((Staff Working Document) SWD(2017) 3 final, 2017), p. 123. Indeed, 
WKH ,QIRUPDWLRQ &RPPLVVLRQHU¶V 2IILFH SXEOLVKHG RQ LWV ZHEVLWH GDWD FRQFHUQLQJ D YDULHW\ RI EUHDFKHV RI
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 Deloitte (2017), Evaluation and review of Directive 2002/58 on privacy and the electronic 
communication sector. A study prepared for the European Commission DG Communications Networks, Content 
& Technology, pp. 111-123. 
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Coherent definition of 
risks 
Mechanisms to make the public aware of security stance 
Table 3 Benchmarks for the evaluation of legislation on cyber security breaches 
 
Mutual learning and awareness share two intertwined sub-goals. The first is the availability of 
inventories of cyber security breaches based on complete and consistent data collection exercises, 
which includes the technology involved. This should be self-explanatory. It means calling the same 
phenomena by the same names, and keeping statistics on incidents affecting the security technology 
deployed, irrespective of the harm caused by the incident, with a view to assess the relative strength of 
a technological solution vis-à-vis other, alternative solutions. Different technologies, in fact, are 
exposed to different risks, and require specific solutions. Hence, surveying the technology involved in 
breaches is crucial for the sake of mutual learning of security solutions, and self-improvement of 
businesses and services. However, this goal finds its roots also in legislation and policy evaluation. 
Article 14 of the Directive on attacks against information systems99 requires Member States to put in 
place a system for the recording, production and provision of statistical data on offences including 
illegal access and illegal interference, to which breaches relate. Consistency in the data collection 
enables relating cyber security breaches to the relevant criminal law provisions (what is the 
equivalence between incidents, breaches, attacks etc.), thus enabling an effective response. Moreover, 
it finds its roots also in the experience that can be derived from the Telecom Framework, whose early 
appraisal is very difficult because of the scarcity100 of data.  
The second, partly related sub-goal, concerns consistent notifications across sectors (possibly 
with coordinated timings), which is crucial for the sake of the data collection referred to above, and 
has been raised as a desideratum by national data protection authorities in the study of the e-Privacy 
Directive conducted by Deloitte.101 
Mutual learning can be further measured by two other goals. The first is engaging in threat-
VKDULQJH[HUFLVHVZKLFKLVGHULYHGIURPWKH3RQHPRQ,QVWLWXWH¶VUHSRUWRQWKHFRVWRIGDWDEUHDFKHV
according to which it reduces the individual cost of breached records.102 This can be done under the 
aegis of the supervisory authority, and thus supports the sub-goal of effective supervision. The second 
is a coherent and consistent definition of risks. This is derived from the appraisal by ENISA, and the 
Working Party 29, of the norms on data breaches in the Telecom Framework.103  
Awareness can be measured by effective supervision, which entails that a competent and agile 
body deal with the overall management of breaches, and that there is coordination between 
supervisory authorities; this is derived from observations of the regulatory framework and the review 
of the e-Privacy Directive,104 DQGLVVXSSRUWHGE\DQDORJ\E\3HWHUV¶DQDO\VLVRIWKH86GDWDEUHDFK
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regime.105 Awareness is also measured by the availability of mechanisms to warn the public of the 
ability of an entity to secure information and services. This is self-explanatory, and can include both 
the obligation to notify to the public, and individuals. This sub-goal is shared with the last goal, which 
is fostering the self-improvement of breached entities, as the fear of bad reputation can represent an 
incentive to prevent breaches from happening. 
Self-improvement is specifically measured by three additional sub-goals. The first concerns 
the coherence of the incentives put in place to enforce security measures. The second is liability, and 
the third is its corollary of the burden of proof. Actually, liability, burden of proof and sanctions are 
different sides of the same coin. Their viability is supported by the extensive work on the state of 
information security,106 (1,6$¶VUHYLHZRIWKH)UDPHZRUN'LUHFWLYH107 work such as that conducted 
by the Expert Group on Cloud Computing Contracts108 DQGE\DQDORJ\E\3HWHUV¶DQDO\VLVRIWKH86
data breach regime.109  
 
4.3. APPRAISING THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The legal analysis conducted in Section 3 allows evaluating the question of notification to 
authorities, to the public, inventories, liability, burden of proof and sanctions. In each table, rows 
contain the relevant regulatory instruments, whereas columns illustrate, in turn, notification to 
authorities and the public (Table 4); maintenance of inventories (Table 5), where the symbol X means 
µSUHVHQFH¶ZKLOHDQHPSW\FHOOPHDQVWKDWLQWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJLQVWUXPHQWWKHVSHFLILFUHTXLUHPHQW
is absent; and liability, burden of proof and sanctions (Table 6). In tables 4 and 6µ1$¶PHDQVWKDW
the instrument does not mention the item. 
 
 Notification to 
national authority 
Notification to 
individuals concerned 
Notification to general 
public 
e-Privacy Directive Always If Adverse effect, 
conditional 
N.A. 
GDPR If Risk  If high risk, conditional As substitute to 
notification to individuals  
Framework Directive If significant impact N.A. If public interest  
eIDAS /authentication If impact on cross-
border reliability 
N.A. N.A. 
eIDAS/ trust services If significant impact  If adverse effect (also 
legal person) 
If public interest  
PSD2 Directive If major operational or 
security 
If impact on financial 
interests 
 
NIS/ essential services If significant impact  N.A. To prevent incident/deal 
with it  
NIS/ digital services If substantial impact  N.A. If public interest  
Table 4 Comparison of rules on notification 
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107
 Tofan, Moulinos and Karsberg (2015). 
108
 Whose papers can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/cloud-computing/expert-
group/index_en.htm. 
109
 3HWHUV  µ6R <RX
YH %HHQ 1RWLILHG 1RZ :KDW" 7KH 3UREOHP ZLWK &XUUHQW 'DWD %UHDFK
1RWLILFDWLRQ/DZV¶ 
© 2018 Maria Grazia Porcedda, Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
 
 23 
Table 5 Comparison on rules on inventories and data sharing 
 Liability Burden of proof Fines/Sanctions Insurance 
e-Privacy Directive As in Data Protection 
Directive 
N.A. As in Data 
Protection Directive 
N.A. 
GDPR For intent and 
negligence  
Tilted on the 
controller or 
joint-controller 
8S WR  ¼
or 4% of global 
annual turnover 
N.A. 
Framework 
Directive 
N.A. N.A. National law N.A. 
eIDAS 
/authentication 
For intent and 
negligence of Member 
State/ issuing 
party/authenticating 
party 
National law National law National law 
eIDAS/ trust 
services 
For intent and 
negligence 
On natural/legal 
person 
N.A. N.A. 
eIDAS/ qualified 
trust services 
For intent and 
negligence 
Inverted National law Y 
PSD2 
 
  
Services: For intent and 
negligence. Payers: for 
intent and gross 
negligence 
Tilted on the 
payment service 
provider 
Left to contracts Y (some 
categories) 
NIS Directive N.A. N.A. National law N.A. 
Table 6 Comparison of rules on liability, sanctions, burden of proof and insurance 
 
Overall, each instrument contains provisions fulfilling, at least in part, each of the three goals. 
However, what the tables clearly show is that there is no consistency between the measures adopted in 
the different instruments. The risk is that of engendering a cacophony that hinders the overall 
achievement of the three goals, thus reducing the ability to counter cyber security breaches. In the 
next section, I elaborate on the implications of such a cacophony of requirements.  
 
4.4. ISSUES WITH THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, AND ITS BEARING ON CYBER 
SECURITY BREACHES 
How does the legal framework fare in terms of mutual learning and awareness? The answer 
tilts, at best, toward indeterminacy. The absence of a uniform obligation to collect statistics stands in 
the way of assessing the exposure to breaches, and putting in place adequate solutions. The case of the 
e-Privacy Directive is in point. Supervisory authorities are not required to maintain a record or 
 Inventory 
by 
businesses 
Summary 
by 
authority 
Summary 
of actions 
taken by 
authority 
To 
Commission 
To 
ENISA 
To 
other 
body 
Optional 
threat 
sharing 
e-Privacy 
Directive 
X       
Framework 
Directive 
 X X X X   
e-IDAS 
Regulation. 
 X  X    
PSD2 Directive     X X X 
NIS Directive  X  X    X  X 
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inventory of the breaches. Hence, there is no comprehensive data, which would need to be collected 
directly from the data protection authorities of each Member State. As seen above, in its (externally 
done) evaluation of the e-Privacy Directive, the European Commission reported that few Member 
States have shared information on data breaches.110 This makes it very difficult to develop mutual 
learning on the functioning of the security measures within one framework, let alone across several 
ones.  
Seen in this light, the fact that 45% of the national regulatory authorities declared not to know 
what the impact of the requirements contained in article 13a of the Framework Directive was on 
security seems less surprising.111 3DUW RI WKH SUREOHP KDV WR GR ZLWK WKH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI µULVNV¶
transposed into national law, as I will discuss shortly. In its  UHSRUW (1,6$ QRWHG WKDW ³it is 
difficult to link the improvement of security measures with the evolution of the number of incidents 
H[SHULHQFHG´ 112 This suggests that the legal framework may be failing the first goal.  
The revised instruments do not seem to be remedying the need for more complete and 
accurate data: none of the instruments specifically requires collecting comparable data. As seen, there 
is no common mandatory labelling to classify the incidents, which is amplified by the variety of terms 
used to refer to breaches in the legislation (discussed in Section 3.1). An easy solution could be to 
build on the work done thus far by ENISA in mapping trends of threats and incidents.  
Still on the issue of inventories, none of the instruments revised apart from the PSD2 require 
collecting information about the technology involved in the breach. Part of the question may have to 
do with the underlying technology neutrality of the instruments revised; while a discussion of the 
merits and limits is beyond the scope of this research,113 nevertheless in the case at hand the lack of 
reference to the technology involved in breaches may be counter-productive. In fact, services covered 
by different legal instruments rely on the same technology. One case in point is that of cloud 
computing services, addressed by the NIS Directive, which essential services (such as IXPs), as well 
as trust services (e.g. e-signatures), rely upon. Many providers of public electronic communications 
services also rely on cloud, e.g. not least for email services. It is interesting to note that ENISA picked 
RQ WKLV SRLQW LQ LWV  UHSRUW ZKHUHE\ ³WKH 1,6 'LUHFWLYH DQG WKH QHZ ((&& FRQYHUJH RQ WKH
incident reporting, as many cloud services of DSPs and digital infrastructure of ESOs share common 
resources coming from tHOHFRPSURYLGHUV´114 The EBA guidelines on the notification requirements of 
the PSD2 contain commented templates for the initial, intermediate and final reporting of major 
incidents.115 3DUW % RI WKH LQWHUPHGLDWH UHSRUW WLWOHG ³LQFLGHQW GHVFULSWLRQ´ LV LQWHQGHG WR FROOHFW
information on the technology involved in the incident. This, and other parts of the notification 
template, could be adopted more widely across the patchwork, possibly after revisions to include all 
substantive categories of cybercrime recognized in Union law, to enable comparable data collection 
on breaches across sectors. 
The understanding of risks is a problem even within single instruments. As seen in relation to 
the Framework Directive, ENISA reported that a challenge in the implementation of security 
PHDVXUHVFRQFHUQVWKHLPSUHFLVHGHILQLWLRQRIµFULWLFDODVVHWV¶DQGµDSSURSULDWHOHYHORIVHFXULW\¶116 A 
common definition of risk, crucial for mutual learning (but also self-improvement), may be in sight. 
ENISA noted, ³The NIS Directive and GDPR will affect the regulatory obligations in the Telecom 
sector, requiring new procedures and more dimensions of information security compliance. The NIS 
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111
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Directive will introduce new requirements in the area of security measures and incident notification 
IRU'LJLWDO6HUYLFH3URYLGHUV'63DQG(VVHQWLDO6HUYLFHV2SHUDWRUV(62´117 
Reaching a common understanding of risks would require, if not regulatory intervention, at 
least cooperation between national regulatory authorities. However, this may be hampered by the 
proliferation of responsible authorities. This is a problem even within single sectors: cooperation is 
hindered by the lack of single contact points, language and applicable law issues, as well as lack of 
coordination procedures.118  These issues are amplified across different instruments. The Telecom 
package assigned responsibility to two different types of regulatory authorities: Telecoms 
Ombudspersons, and National Data Protection Authorities. Responsibility for the monitoring of 
breaches under the eIDAS Regulation and NIS Directive119 are likely to be assigned to different 
regulatory/supervisory authorities. Cooperation is, as much as supervision (crucial for awareness), 
sectorial and piecemeal, and may well lead to failing to grasp the bigger picture. In this respect, the 
fact that the NIS and eIDAS Regulation impose cooperation between the supervisory authority and 
the NDPA in case of a data breach, with ENISA in case of incidents involving two or more states, and 
with law enforcement authorities whenever incidents are triggered by computer-related crime is 
welcome. Best practice may build upon the recent cyber exercise coordinated by the Joint Research 
Centre, 120  and those carried out by ENISA to achieve strategic, operational and technical 
convergence.121 
The question as to whether the legal framework is achieving the goal of self-improvement is 
also hard to answer. In its appraisal of Art. 13(1)(a) of the Framework Directive, ENISA noted that 
almost one third (27%) of regulatory authorities were faced with reluctance from Telcos in 
implementing the new regulations.122 The last Eurostat poll123 on network and information security 
revealed that 60% of businesses in the field of information and communications have a security policy 
in place, which, in line with current practice, is the first step for fulfilling the risk management 
approach required by Art. 13(1)(a) of the Framework Directive.  In this context, 60% appears too low 
a figure; it leads to wonder whether a strong liability framework could have pushed businesses to 
comply. To be sure, there are opinions that discount the usefulness of tougher regulations and new 
laws, such as the Cyber Rehab project, 124  which proposes to improve internet hygiene through 
cooperation and offering incentives to service providers that act as good netizens. However, the 
SURMHFW LWVHOI VXJJHVWV µSXQLVKLQJ¶ WKH QRQ-compliant internet service providers by excluding them 
from peering agreements, thus losing their infrastructure. In agreement with Peters, 125  adequate 
liability and sanctions may be the only way to force companies to adopt adequate security measures to 
protect information and services.  
The questions of liability and of the wider implications of the regulatory framework is best 
discussed in relation to cloud computing. 
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Commission (2017), Making the most of NIS, p. 13. 
120
 0DODWUDVDQGRWKHUVµ3DQ-European personal data breaches: Mapping of current practices and 
UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVWRIDFLOLWDWHFRRSHUDWLRQDPRQJ'DWD3URWHFWLRQ$XWKRULWLHV¶ 
121
 Ibid, p. 463. 
122
 Tofan, Moulinos and Karsberg (2015), p. 17. 
123
 Eurostat data available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/ICT_security_in_enterprises. 
124
 -RKQ /H\GHQ µ&\EHU5HKDE
V PLVVLRQ" 7R FOHDQ XS WKH LQWHUQHW RQH $61 EORFN DW D WLPH¶ The 
Register (31 August 2017). 
125
 3HWHUV  µ6R <RX
YH %HHQ 1RWLILHG 1RZ :KDW" 7KH 3UREOHP ZLWK &XUUHQW 'DWD %UHDFK
1RWLILFDWLRQ/DZV¶ 
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5. Implications of the regulatory patchwork: the case of cloud computing 
Since cloud computing is a technology common to all legal instruments revised in this paper, as 
well as DWHFKQRORJ\SRZHULQJWRGD\¶VXVHRIWKH,QWHUQHWDQGHQDEOLQJWKHVR-called datafication and 
the ensuing data economy,126 it is a case in point to show the drawbacks of the inconsistencies of the 
patchwork of laws regulating breaches of security. I begin by briefly positioning cloud computing in 
EU law. I then discuss the rules applicable to cloud computing contained in the NIS Directive. 
Subsequently, I appraise how the rules contained in the NIS Directive interact with the rules contained 
in the GDPR. The result reinforces the feeling of indeterminacy paved for by the regulatory 
patchwork (and leads to question whether this state of affairs maintains the insecurity of services, 
leading to further breaches). 
 
5.1 CLOUD COMPUTING IN EU LAW 
The NIS Directive dHILQHVFORXGFRPSXWLQJDV³DVHUYLFHWKDWHQDEOHVDFFHVVWRDVFDODEOHDQG
HODVWLF SRRO RI UHVRXUFHV´ $UW  5HVRXUFHV UHIHU WR ERWK FRPSXWDWLRQDO SRZHU DQG VWRUDJH
space. Scalability and elasticity are not defined, but the first commonly means that resources can be 
increased or decreased as needed, while the second refers to the fact that different users employ the 
service differently within the day.127 
Public clouds are usually further classified into three categories, namely software as a service 
(SaaS), infrastructure as a service (IaaS), and platform as a service (PaaS).128 The first includes the use 
of software stored remotely, e.g. email services or document compilation services. The second usually 
refers to the use of server space for computational power or storage. The third usually refers to 
services, such as software, that can be tailored by users, or platforms for the production of software 
applications, or databases.129 
In the NIS Directive, cloud computing is defined as a digital service, which falls within the 
broader category of information society services. These are defined in the amended e-Commerce 
Directive130 DV ³DQ\ VHUYLFHQRUPDOO\SURYLGHG IRU UHPXQHUDWLRQ DW DGLVWDQFH E\HOHFWURQLFPHDQV
and at the individual request of a recipient oIVHUYLFHV´)RUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKLVGHILQLWLRQ³LµDWD
GLVWDQFH¶PHDQVWKDWWKHVHUYLFHLVSURYLGHGZLWKRXWWKHSDUWLHVEHLQJVLPXOWDQHRXVO\SUHVHQWLLµE\
HOHFWURQLFPHDQV¶PHDQVWKDWWKHVHUYLFHLVVHQWLQLWLDOO\DQGUHFHLYHGDWLWVGHVWLQDWLRQby means of 
electronic equipment for the processing (including digital compression) and storage of data, and 
entirely transmitted, conveyed and received by wire, by radio, by optical means or by other 
HOHFWURPDJQHWLFPHDQVLLLµDWWKHLQGLYLGXDOUHTXHVW RIDUHFLSLHQWRIVHUYLFHV¶PHDQVWKDWWKHVHUYLFH
LVSURYLGHGWKURXJKWKHWUDQVPLVVLRQRIGDWDRQLQGLYLGXDOUHTXHVW´ 
 
                                                 
126
 European Commission (2017), (Communication) COM (2017) 9 final. 
127
 For further clarifications, see European Commission (2017), Making the most of NIS. 
128
 For a technical analysis of the cloud, see Michael Armbrust and others, Above the Clouds: A Berkeley 
View of Cloud Computing. (Technical Report No UCB/EECS-2009-28, 2009). 
129
 See discussion in European Commission (2017), Making the most of NIS, pp. 32-37. 
130
 Directive 2015/1535/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 Laying 
down a Procedure for the Provision of Information in the Field of Technical Regulations and of Rules on 
Information Society services (codification), OJ L 241. 
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5.2 THE CLOUD AND CYBER SECURITY BREACHES 
7KH1,6'LUHFWLYHVHHNVWR³HQVXUHDKLJKOHYHORIKDUPRQLVDWLRQIRUGLJLWDOVHUYLFHproviders 
ZLWKUHVSHFWWRVHFXULW\DQGQRWLILFDWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWV«LQDPDQQHUSURSRUWLRQDWHWRWKHLUQDWXUHDQG
WKHGHJUHHRIULVNZKLFKWKH\PLJKWIDFH´7KHQDWXUHRIFORXGFRPSXWLQJDVVHHQDERYHLVWKDWRID
digital service provider. Unlike operators of essential services, digital services providers do not have a 
GLUHFWOLQNZLWKSK\VLFDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUHEXWUDWKHUKDYHD³FURVV-ERUGHUQDWXUH´5HFLWDODQGDVD
result are subject to different notification requirements. 
First of all (1), pursuant WR$UWLFOH0HPEHU6WDWHVFDQQRWLPSRVHDGGLWLRQDO³VHFXULW\
RU QRWLILFDWLRQ UHTXLUHPHQWV RQ´ FORXG SURYLGHUV WKDQ WKRVH LQFOXGHG LQ WKH 'LUHFWLYH DQG IXUWKHU
specified by Commission Regulation 2018/151.131  
Secondly (2), cloud providers must notif\ DQ LQFLGHQW WKDW KDV D ³VXEVWDQWLDO LPSDFW RQ WKH
SURYLVLRQRIDVHUYLFH´$UWDQGIRUZKLFKWKHSURYLGHUKDV³DFFHVVWRWKHLQIRUPDWLRQQHHGHG
WRDVVHVVWKHLPSDFWRIDQLQFLGHQWDJDLQVWWKHSDUDPHWHUV´HVWDEOLVKHGE\WKH'LUHFWLYH$UW)). 
1RWHWKDWWKHVHFRQGLWLRQVDUHIRUPXODWHG LQDZD\WKDWDSSHDUVFXPXODWLYH0RUHRYHUµVXEVWDQWLDO¶
LPSDFWLVPRUHUHVWULFWLYHWKDQµVLJQLILFDQW¶ZKLFKLVWKHFULWHULRQXVHGLQUHODWLRQWRHVVHQWLDOVHUYLFHV
in Art. 14(3). In fact, in addition to the parameters identified for operators of essential services, the 
article lists two further criteria (of fthe list in Art. 6), to judge the impact of an incident. These criteria 
have been clarified by Commission Regulation 2018/151 (Art. 3), and are: ³G WKH extent of the 
GLVUXSWLRQRIWKHIXQFWLRQLQJRIWKHVHUYLFH´XQGHUVWRRGLQWHUPVRILQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\FDQRQVDQG
³H WKH H[WHQW RI WKH LPSDFW RQ HFRQRPLF DQG VRFLHWDO DFWLYLWLHV´ WREH DVVHVVHG LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH
nature of the contractual relation with the customer or the number of users affected, or significant 
material or non-material losses, e.g. in relation to health, safety or damage to property. I will come 
back to this point in Section 5.3. 
Thirdly (3), disclosure of the incident suffered by cloud providers to the public is not 
mandatory but, differently from the case of operators of essential services, dissemination can 
nonetheless be decided, ³ZKHUHGLVFORVXUHRIWKHLQFLGHQWLVRWKHUZLVHLQWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVW´$UW
(7)). Moreover, these rules do not concern small or micro enterprises132 (Art. 16 (11)).  
Fourthly (4), supervisory measures should take place ex post facto (article 17). Recital 60 
FODULILHV WKDW ³GLJLWDO VHUYLFH SURYLGHUV VKRXOG EH VXEMHFW WR OLJKW-touch and reactive ex post 
supervisory activities justified by the nature of their services and operations. The competent authority 
FRQFHUQHG VKRXOG WKHUHIRUH RQO\ WDNH DFWLRQ ZKHQ SURYLGHG ZLWK HYLGHQFH« WKDW D GLJLWDO VHUYLFH
provider is not complying with the requirements of this Directive, in particular following the 
RFFXUUHQFHRIDQLQFLGHQW´ 
Finally (5), the regime for sanctions and liability is left to each Member State, according to 
national law. 
Table 7 summarises the findings. Each point discussed in the text is marked by a number, e.g. 
(1), and is synthetically shown in the box corresponding to the relevant sub-goal of the benchmark. 
Table 7 shows that, in the case of cloud computing, the Directive fails one or more sub-goals, which 
are struck-off and substituted by a blander rule.133 
 
                                                 
131
 As discussed earlier, in section 2.2.1. Rather, the Directive seems to imply that additional security 
requirements may be imposed on public-sector bodies (Recital 56). 
132
 6PDOOHQWHUSULVHVDUHEXVLQHVVHVZLWK OHVV WKDQSHRSOHDQGD WXUQRYHUEHORZPLOOLRQ¼PLFUR
HQWHUSULVHV DUH EXVLQHVVHV ZLWK OHVV WKDQ  SHRSOH DQG D WXUQRYHU RI OHVV WKDQ  PLOOLRQ ¼ $FFRUGLQJ WR
Eurostat, they represent the majority of EU enterprises: European Commission (2012), Commission Staff 
Working Paper SEC(2012) 72 final, p. 118. 
133
 For criticism of the NIS Directive beyond the cloud, see Rebecca Wong, Data Security Breaches and 
Privacy in Europe (Springer 2015), chapter 10. 
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MUTUAL 
LEARNING 
AWARENESS  SELF-IMPROVEMENT  
Inventories based on complete and consistent data 
collection, including reference to technology 
Coherent regime on liability  
Sanctions and liability left to each MS 
(5) 
Consistent notification, including standard timing  
Notification by cloud provider due only if incident is 
VXEVWDQWLDO  ³SURYLGHU KDV ³LQIRUPDWLRQ WR DVVHVV
impact´ 
Coherent regime on burden of proof 
Standard burden of proof (5) 
Threat-sharing exercise 
 
Effective supervision: 
Supervision is ex post, 
prompted by evidence (4) 
Incentives for security measures 
MS cannot impose strict security 
requirements (1) 
Coherent definition of 
risks 
Mechanisms to make the public aware of security stance 
Public notification is not mandatory (3) 
Table 7 Benchmarks appraised in relation to rules applicable to cloud computing. 
Such rules may reflect the reality of a market composed of mostly extra EU service providers. 
Indeed, the main cloud market players - Amazon, Google, Hewlett Packard, IBM, Microsoft, Joyent 
cloud, Rackspace, Salesforce.com and VMware (which does not provide hosting services) ± are based 
in the United states. According to the Synergy Research Group, the cloud infrastructure leader for the 
third quarter of 2016 was Amazon AWS, which alone had more than 40% of the market share.134  
It is hard to come by figures that indicate the share of these players, as well as the European 
ones,135 in the European market. Recent Eurostat data shows that the cloud is used by 21% of EU 
enterprises, with lows of 20% in essential services and of 54% in ICT. Most enterprises rely on the 
cloud for email and storage of files, with clear implications for personal data.136 To increase the 
adoption of cloud by enterprises in the EU, the European Commission launched the Cloud initiative, 
ZKLFKLVKRSHGWRVWUHQJWKHQ³(XURSH¶VSRVLWLRQLQGDWD-driven innovation, improve competitiveness 
DQGFRKHVLRQDQGKHOSFUHDWHD6LQJOH'LJLWDO0DUNHW LQ(XURSH´137 A limiting factor identified by 
the Eurostat survey seems to be the fear of breaches of security. This fear is not ungrounded, as shown 
by the many reported leaks of $PD]RQ¶V $: EXFNHWV138 DV ZHOO DV QHZV RI D PDOLFLRXV µVHDUFK
HQJLQH¶WRDFFHVVHVILUPV¶VHQVLWLYHGRFXPHQWVKHOGLQWKRVHEXFNHWV139 Moreover, in its 2017 report, 
the Ponemon Institute calculated that the cost per capita of a breach increases by USD 14.3 in case of 
extensive cloud migration; this figure reaches USD 16.3 in case of third party involvement (sub-
contracting is not unusual in the case of cloud). 
The information at hand is insufficient to claim once and for all whether cloud computing 
undermines rather than support NIS, but rather seems to confirm the point made earlier on the need to 
collect data on cyber security breaches that duly takes technology into account. However, the fact that 
provisions on cloud computing contained in the NIS Directive fail in different respects the three sub-
goals (starting from the noticeable point that Member States cannot impose higher security 
requirements on cloud providers than those agreed at EU level) has an immediate impact on securing 
                                                 
134
 See at: http://www.itmanagerdaily.com/cloud-computing-vendors/. 
135
 A list of top IaaS European players can be found at: https://www.channele2e.com/channel-
partners/csps/top-10-european-cloud-services-providers-csps-for-iaas-list/.   
136
 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Cloud_computing_-
_statistics_on_the_use_by_enterprises. 
137
 Quoted from <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/%20european-cloud-initiative>. See also 
European Commission (2017), (Communication) COM (2017) 9 final.  
138
 $OL)DKDGµ2SHQ$:66%XFNHW/HDNV+RWHO%RRNLQJ6HUYLFH'DWD¶AWS News (22 August 2017). 
Stylianou et al. note how cloud providers, including IAAS, are not committed to adequate security. Stylianou et 
DOµ3URWHFWLQJXVHUSULYDF\LQWKH&ORXGDQDQDO\VLVRIWHUPVRIVHUYLFH¶(XURSHDQ-RXUQDORI/DZDQG
Technology, p. 10. 
139
 I am grateful to Prof. David Wall for pointing me to this. %%& µ6HDUFK WRRO DFFHVVHV ILUPV

GRFXPHQWVLQWKHFORXG¶BBC (14 February 2018). 
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the cloud, and may ultimately counteract the positive efforts of the regulatory patchwork, as I discuss 
next.  
 
5.3 THE PATCHWORK AND THE CLOUD: THE CASE STUDY OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
INSTITUTIONS INCLUDING TEACHING HOSPITALS 
The NIS Directive distinguishes between the case of a cloud provider offering its services to an 
essential operator and to any other businesses. Here I wish to discuss how the rules would play out in 
the case of higher education institutions (i.e. universities) featuring a teaching hospital. Higher 
education institutions, which are a big data producer and repository, rely amply on cloud solutions. As 
a result, they are exposed to breaches affecting cloud services. As for the UK, the Times unveiled that, 
in 2016-17, higher education institutions that had responded to its freedom of information requests 
had suffered from 1100 breaches. These resulted from distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, 
spam, and ransomware, and aimed at intellectual property resulting from years of research, non-
sensitive personal information to carry out identity theft and loss of patients records.140 On top of that, 
a breach of security of cloud services offered to the teaching hospital branch of the higher education 
institution could affect the distribution of drugs to patients, the triage system of A&E, and the 
functioning of other basic hospital services. This case is interesting because it embraces both sets of 
rules applicable to digital service providers. The teaching hospital is affected by the provisions on 
cloud, which concern operators of essential services. The higher education institution is affected by 
the rules on cloud offering its services to businesses other than operators of essential services; unless 
those businesses are covered by sector-specific rules, the NIS rules act as the lex specialis.141 
I begin with discussing the implications of a breach for the teaching hospital. According to a literal 
interpretation of Art. 16 (5) of the NIS Directive, if a cloud provider suffers from an incident that 
affects significantly its operation, it would be for the operator of essential services to notify the 
incident. Neither the Recitals nor the Commission142 seems to clarify this point, and the reader is left 
wondering whether the Directive is incorrectly worded.143 Consequently, the Directive is currently 
silent about the obligation of a cloud provider offering services to essential service operators to notify 
a breach without undue delay. Moreover, as I anticipated in the previous section, essential service 
operators must notify significant incidents, whereas cloud providers must only notify substantial ones, 
which could create a severe short-circuit in the law (resulting from the incoherence of notification as 
discussed earlier). The fact that Art. 3 (5) of Commission Regulation 2018/151 implies that a 
substantial incident is one having a significant impact on economic and societal activities may address 
such short-circuit, because significance is to be assessed sector by sector. An official interpretation of 
this point is warranted.  
Here we can distinguish between the following cases: a breach that does or does not 
significantly affect the continuity of the services offered by the hospital, and one that does or does not 
affect personal data (which paves the way for a matrix of four different circumstances). A breach of 
security that does not concern personal data and is not significant within the remit of the NIS 
                                                 
140Peter <HXQJDQG5RVHPDU\%HQQHWWµ8QLYHUVLW\VHFUHWVDUHVWROHQE\F\EHUJDQJV6FLHQWLILF5HVHDUFK
7DUJHWHGE\+DFNHUV¶The Times (5 September 2017). These data seem to confirm previous research showing 
the cybersecurity struggle of UK research and higher education institutions that involved 50 universities 
commissioned by the cloud provider VMware, mentioned in &KULV +DYHUJDO µ8. XQLYHUVLWLHV 
ORVLQJ F\EHU
VHFXULW\EDWWOH
¶Times Higher Education (16 March 2016). 
141
 European Commission (2017), Making the most of NIS, p. 37. The PSD2 falls outside the scope of the 
notification rules contained in the NIS Directive (Art. 1 (7) and Recital 12), ibid, p. 37. The same applies to 
Telecom operators and assurance and trust services (Art. 1 (3)). 
142
 European Commission (2017), Making the most of NIS. 
143
 :KLFKUHDGV³Where an operator of essential services relies on a third-party digital service provider 
for the provision of a service which is essential for the maintenance of critical societal and economic activities, 
any significant impact on the continuity of the essential services due to an incident affecting the digital service 
provider shall be notified by that operator´DVRSSRVHGWR³to WKDWRSHUDWRU´RU³E\WKDWservice provider´ 
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Directive would not need to be notified; this represents clearly the contradiction inherent in the 
concept of notification highlighted by Bourdon et al. (discussed in Section 1), and constitutes a missed 
opportunity for mutual learning and awareness. A significant breach affecting non-personal data (e.g. 
the loss of anonymised medical data for research purposes) would suffer from the lack of clarity 
concerning the distinction between substantial and significant incidents. A delayed notification could 
have serious consequences for the hospital, and NIS. Two recitals capable of applying to public 
operators may suggest a solution to the impasse, which could also be followed, by analogy, by private 
operators. Recital 54 encourages public administrations using services offered by digital service 
SURYLGHUVWR³UHTXLUHIURPWKHSURYLGHUVRIVXFKVHUYLFHVDGGLWLRQDOVHFXULW\PHDVXUHV«by means of 
FRQWUDFWXDOREOLJDWLRQV´5HFLWDO3XEOLF-sector bodieVFRXOGDOVREHUHTXLUHG³WRHQVXUHVSHFLILF
VHFXULW\ UHTXLUHPHQWV ZKHQ WKH\ FRQWUDFW FORXG FRPSXWLQJ VHUYLFHV´ EXW WKHVH PHDVXUHV ³VKRXOG
apply to the public-VHFWRUERG\FRQFHUQHG´5HFLWDOHence, it is envisaged that the matter will be 
resolved contractually, as currently is the case. Contracts will address responsibility for notification 
and the ensuing liability in accordance with national laws, which may differ as to, for instance, 
damages, intention, negligence, burden of proof or relevant applicable procedural rules. This brings us 
to the question of self-improvement. In the NIS Directive, notification should not lead to increased 
liability for the notifying party (Art. 14 (3)). Whenever notified, the competent authority shall 
preserve the security and commercial interests, as well as the confidentiality of the information 
provided in the notification of both the operator of essential services and digital service providers 
(Art. 14 (5) and Art. 16 (6)). Rather, whenever possible the notified bodiHVPXVWSURYLGH³LQIRUPDWLRQ
WKDW FRXOG VXSSRUW WKH HIIHFWLYH LQFLGHQW KDQGOLQJ´ 7KH (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ ([SHUW *URXS RQ
Cloud Computing Contracts144 showed how cloud contractors tried to cap and limit their liability. The 
Group noted that, given how hard it is to assess technical responsibility in the cloud, it could be 
difficult to follow standard rules on the burden of proof,145 a conclusion similarly reached by Peters in 
relation to case law in the US,146 and which would potentially leave teaching hospitals exposed (and 
fail to provide incentives for the cloud to improve). 
Particularly in the case of data breaches, cloud providers have been known to try to shield 
responsibility by presenting themselves as processor in cloud contracts,147 which brings us to the case 
of breaches of security affecting personal data, where the GDPR is the lex specialis.148 On the one 
hand, the contract149 signed between the cloud provider and the hospital will be relevant to assess the 
FORXG¶V position as either a processor or a joint-controller, according to established interpretation of 
data protection law. On the other hand, the exact role of the cloud provider will depend on the nature 
of the processing activities carried out and the degree of involvement in determining the means and 
purposes of the processing.150 Pursuant to Art. 33 of the GDPR, the controller or joint-controller 
should notify a breach to the supervisory authority without undue delay, and the processor should do 
the same with respect to the controller (though not all breaches are to be notified, with clear losses for 
the sub-goal mutual understanding). Liability would attach to both, but with a higher threshold in the 
case of processors as discussed in Section 3.3.2, because the principle of accountability only applies 
to controller(s). As a controller, the hospital is accountable: to be exempted from liability for the 
damage caused by processing, it must be able to prove that it is not in any way responsible for the 
event giving rise to the damage, and to demonstrate compliance with the principles relating to the 
                                                 
144
 See in particular the Discussion paper on "Liability for non-compliance with data protection 
obligations", Discussion paper on "Unfair terms in cloud computing contracts", and Discussion paper on 
"Liability" available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/cloud-computing/expert-group/index_en.htm.  
145
 Ibid.  
146
 3HWHUV  µ6R <RX
YH %HHQ 1RWLILHG 1RZ :KDW" 7KH 3UREOHP ZLWK &XUUHQW 'DWD %UHDFK
Notification LaZV¶ 
147
 Ibid.  
148
 Recital 9 of NIS Directive, Art. 2 and European Commission (2017), Making the most of NIS, p. 37, 
note 40.  
149
 Simon Bradshaw, Christopher Millard and Ian Walden, Contracts for Clouds: A Comparative 
Analysis of Terms and Conditions for Cloud Computing Services (2010). 
150
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2SLQLRQ  RQ WKH &RQFHSWV RI µ&RQWUROOHU¶ DQG
µ3URFHVVRU
 (2010). 
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processing of personal data. This include selecting a processor (a cloud provider) that ensures an 
adequate level of security (Art. 28 (1)). Whilst the provisions inserted in the contract may help, the 
higher threshold for the notification of breaches to which cloud providers are usually subject (vis-à-vis 
non-personal data), and the lack of access to relevant technical information by the hospital as noted 
above, may represent an obstacle to the fulfilment of accountability. Moreover, in the time needed to 
attribute responsibility, individuals may suffer from a cascade of harms. The strength of these rules, 
and the achievement of the sub-goal of self-improvement, will depend on the dissuasive role played 
by sanction, as well as the ad hoc enforcement of the Regulation in this area. In fact, the GDPR 
allows Member States to adopt different rules on the processing of data for medical purposes, 
including requiring controllers to obtain prior authorization from the supervisory authority for 
processing operations in relation to public health (Art. 36 (5)), which may redress the issues discussed 
above. 
I now move to discussing the implications of a breach for the remainder of the higher education 
institution. Here again there are differences between types of incidents. As for incidents that do not 
DIIHFWSHUVRQDOGDWD WKH IDFW WKDW WKH µLQFLGHQW¶PXVWEH VXEVWDQWLDO IRU LW WREHQRWLILHGKLQGHUV WKH
achievement of mutual learning and awareness and leaves higher education institutions exposed to 
damages. The contractual solution proposed by Recitals 54 and 56 of the NIS Directive is likely to be 
followed here, too, and the issues of lack of technical knowledge to assess responsibility behind the 
incident may put higher education institutions in a difficult situation. As for incidents that affect 
personal data, higher education institutions are likely to enjoy the exceptions contained in data 
protection legislation for data processing for purposes of historical, scientific and statistical research, 
which are also listed in the GDPR (Art. 89). The considerations made for hospitals in terms of liability 
and difficulty of fulfilling the principle of accountability also apply here. Similarly, it is interesting to 
see how national laws will differ on expectations and exemptions made for higher education 
institutions (in case of mismanagement of personal data).   
In conclusion, the interaction between the patchwork, exemplified here by the GDPR and the 
NIS Directive, leads to indeterminacy, which may undermine the three benchmarks, irrespective of 
whether the incident concerns personal or non-personal data. The high threshold for the notification of 
breaches (aimed at minimizing costs for the notifying parties, as noted by Bourdon et al.) for cloud 
providers means that many incidents may go undetected, which frustrates the goals of mutual learning 
and awareness. The contractual solution seems to be addressing the symptom, rather than the cause, 
and may make it difficult to assess responsibility, thus also affecting self-improvement, in what 
becomes a vicious circle.  
According to De Bruin and Floridi, as well as Prüfer, no further legislation should be adopted to 
spur the adoption of appropriate security measures. De Bruin and Floridi 151  propose to foster 
µWUDQVSDUHQF\¶RI WKH FORXGSURYLGHU WKHHWKLFDOSULQFLSOHRI WUDQVOXFHQF\ 152 This may redress the 
fact,  noted by Prüfer, that all cloud computing services suffer from adverse selection or the lemons 
SUREOHPZKHUHE\JLYHQWKH³ORZZLOOLQJQHVV-to-pay of buyers, only sellers who actually supply low 
DFFRXQWDELOLW\ZLOOSRSXODWH WKHPDUNHW´153 In this respect, Prüfer154 proposes resorting to certifying 
authorities and conflict resolution by arbitration. His model has the appeal of economic pareto-
efficiency; however, for the certification authority to be impartial and ensure the respect of the bodies 
of laws in which it operates, and amenable to courts, it would need to be set up itself by a law.  
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 %RXGHZLMQGH%UXLQDQG/XFLDQR)ORULGLµ7KH(WKLFVRI&ORXG&RPSXWLQJ¶6FLHQFH(QJLQHHULQJ
Ethics 21-39. 
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 Indeed, toothless transparency has led to the jungle of notices reviewed, among others, by Stylianou et 
al., µ3URWHFWLQJXVHUSULYDF\LQWKH&ORXGDQDQDO\VLVRIWHUPVRIVHUYLFH¶(XURSHDQ-RXUQDORI/DZDQG
Technology. 
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 Jens Prüfer, How to Govern the Cloud? Characterizing the optimal enforcement institution that 
supports accountability in cloud computing (2013) p. 35. 
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 Prüfer (2013), p. 35. 
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Without well-reasoned and well-enforced laws and adequate incentives, we can expect the data 
economy to foster increasing and ever bigger breaches, particularly in the light of the requirement to 
increase the flow of non-personal data155 (including data which is presently anonymised, but which 
could possibly become re-identifiable with further advances of computing). Incentives mostly concern 
personal data as contained the GDPR, incentives that have yet to be tested. In fact, the reflections 
contained in this section are partly speculative, because the GDPR has just entered into force, many of 
its provisions require national implementation, and the NIS Directive must be transposed into national 
law. The state of flux of the second wave of regulation, however, may be blessing in disguise, as it 
leaves room for corrections and interventions en route. 
6. Conclusions: patching the patchwork 
Cyber security breaches are on the rise, one of the reasons being the well-known lack of 
incentives to secure services and their underlying technologies such as cloud computing, incentives 
that the patchwork of laws on breaches may be failing to provide. The current legal framework seems 
to be offering solutions to the symptoms, rather than the causes. Liability of middle users such as data 
controllers, who rely on third-party cloud applications, and contractual solutions pushing towards the 
wider take up of cyber insurance, would provide some redress to distressed natural and legal 
persons,156 and this would certainly not be a negative result.157 However, it may leave the real risks, 
and responsibilities, unaddressed. In fact, legislation on cyber security breaches, whose overarching 
goal is to ensure an adequate level of information and network security, may be failing to meet the 
three goals: (i) providing the necessary level of mutual learning on the functioning of security 
measures; (ii) raising awareness of both regulatory authorities and the public on how entities fare in 
protecting data; (iii) and enforcing self-improvement of entities dealing with information and services. 
The second regulatory wave (eIDAS Regulation, the PSD2, the GDPR and the NIS Directive) 
benefitted from only partial lessons drawn from the first regulatory wave (Telecom Framework) and, 
since each instrument was adopted independently, it yielded potentially contradictory results. Policy-
makers can still redress these issues in the third regulatory wave, but the EECC has the inherent limit 
of being sector-specific (vertical). 
Part of the problem could be addressed by collecting data on breaches that are mindful of the 
technological environment, but also by an active attempt to create more harmony among the 
regulatory patchwork. For instance, responsible authorities could cooperate to create a middle-level of 
integration, with the aim of pursing national convergence of EU law. This could include an 
observatory of the national legislation adopted with respect to breaches in the different sectors. Such 
level of awareness may yield best practice, which could be adopted at an EU-wide level. 158 
Cooperation by the authorities responsible for different instruments could lead to a common definition 
of risks, and the measures best suited to address such risks. 
<HW WR SDWFK WKH FXUUHQW SDWFKZRUN DQG ZLWK LW LQIRUPDWLRQ LQVHFXULW\ PHDVXUHV RI µSXEOLF
RUGHULQJ¶DUHUHTXLUHGWRLQFHQWLYLVHWKHDGRSWLRQRIEHWWHUWHFKQLFDODQGRUJDQLVDWLRQDOPHDVXUHVDQG
provide better remedies, as also encouraged by Peters and Bourdon et al.. First, the results of 
cooperation among national authorities could inform a piece of EU law mandating the consistent, and 
technology-sensitive, collection of information on cyber security breaches. Collection could be 
overseen by ENISA, the NIS Cooperation Group, the Data Protection Board, or by the three together. 
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Secondly, it is hoped that a strong implementation of the GDPR will create some of the hitherto 
missing incentives to protect information. 159  Thirdly, policy makers should seriously discuss 
introducing liability for security vendors.160 )RULQVWDQFH3UIHU¶VLGHDRIUHO\LQJRQFHUWLILFDWLRQDVD
form of private ordering161 can be espoused with the system of qualified/unqualified trust service 
providers created by the eIDAS Regulation.162 There, qualified trust service providers wishing to offer 
their services to public bodies need to undergo a process of certification, whereby they adhere by 
certain standards. The process whereby service providers become qualified has the advantage of 
µUHVSRQVLELOLVLQJ¶WKHSURYLGHUE\DOVRUHYHUVLQJWKHEXUGHQRISURRIWKLVFRXOGSRVVLEO\OHDGWRWKH
further expansion of cyber insurance, but in a way in which the causes of cyber insecurity are 
addressed together with the symptoms. Eventually such an approach may lead to achieve the three 
goals of mutual learning on the functioning of security measures, awareness of both regulatory 
authorities and the public on how entities fare in protecting data, and enforcing self-improvement of 
entities dealing with information and services (thus neutralizing the conceptual incoherency of 
notification). 
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